Ahmet Kuru’s Cambridge University Press book, “Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment: A Global and Historical Comparison” (2019) is a unique and provocative book. Parts of the data referenced are dated (e.g., 2009 and 2010 data in a 2019 publication) but this does not alter the argument being made (which is historically based). In essence, the author argues that democracy is the solution. The book raises many questions. As a reader, I sensed when he was sharing the ideas of the book he encountered many people pushing back and this book grapples with a wide range of potential challenges to the ideas presented. 

I have some questions about the book. In general, I am skeptical of single solution recommendations for a wide range of countries, contexts and peoples. I am also skeptical of a single cause for complex problems. This book offers both. There is a repeated call for democracy as the solution prescription, the nature of which is undefined. The author does not reflect if the question is one of inclusive, participatory governance, or of a specific model that should be copied and/or imposed. The book suggests that a shift of power (from merchants to a politically-aligned religious class) was the mechanism for a change toward authoritarianism. What remains untested is the strength of this mechanism as a determining factor over time or in the present. For example, in countries without a strong tie between religious leaders and political elite, does one find the expected outcomes suggested? To this reader it seems not, but the author does not ask or test the counter argument. A few notes:

“Ghazali also emphasizes other aspects of “commanding right and forbidding wrong,” which sound more positive for a modern reader, such as intervening whenever there is an injustice and speaking truth to power in the face of oppressive ruler.67 To put these ideas into practice in contemporary societies would be to establish either an authoritarian state with a religious police (à la Mawardi) or an anarchy in which citizens constantly intervene in each other’s daily lives, even by force (à la Ghazali). In short, the central Islamic concept of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” needs a modern interpretation to become compatible with democracy and individual freedom.” (p. 47)

“There has been a debate over whether the developmental successes of East Asian authoritarian states, including China, have discredited the emphasis on democracy in development.28 Three points in these debates are directly relevant to the analysis of Muslim countries. First, as Chapters 1 and 2 explained, Muslim and East Asian countries currently have different types of authoritarianism. In the Muslim world, authoritarian states to various and changing degrees have been rentier, militaristic, and/or religious. In contrast, in East Asia, most authoritarian states have focused on export-oriented production, not rentierism; have concentrated on developmentalist policies and economically expansionist goals, rather than military policies and goals; and have embraced secular, not religious, ideologies and discourses. Thus, the developmental success of the East Asian type of authoritarianism does not necessarily bear on criticisms of other forms of authoritarianism dominant in Muslim countries.” (p. 62)

“Negative conditions began to develop in Muslim lands in the tenth and eleventh centuries in a multidimensional manner. Diminishing agricultural revenues weakened the old economic regime. The new economic regime, based on the revenue assignments to military personnel, iqtas, was associated with the militarization of the economy. Meanwhile, Sunni orthodoxy was already taking shape, though its full formation would require state power. In the increasingly militarized economic system, merchants began to lose their previously central role. This marginalization meant decreasing opportunities for private funding for Islamic scholars and an incentive for them to accept state patronage. Meantime, the political expansion of Shii forces provoked a Sunni reaction. These socioeconomic, religious, and political conditions made possible the emergence of the ulema–state alliance. Seljuk ulema and rulers took advantage of these convenient conditions in the critical juncture of the eleventh century to establish an alliance.” (p. 116)

“My historical analysis may seem deterministic and pessimistic; in fact, it is neither. By explaining the ulema–state alliance as an eleventh-century construction, my analysis has indicated the possibility of change and the reasonableness of optimism. It has exposed the historical inaccuracy of seeing the ulema–state alliance as something essential to Islamic texts or permanent in Islamic history. Contemporary perceptions of Islam as a religion that necessarily rejects religion–state separation are mistaken. Hence, Muslims can redesign the relationship between their religion and their states in way that would promote intellectual and economic creativity. Moreover, my analysis has shown that there is a historical basis for such a reform. From the eighth to the tenth century, Islamic scholars were mostly funded by commerce and largely avoided serving the state. During this period, Muslim societies produced cutting-edge polymaths and influential merchants. Critically analyzing Muslim history may contribute to the construction of a new, democratic, and progressive relationship between Islam and the state today. In order to solve the problems of violence, authoritarianism, and underdevelopment, as well as catch up to Western levels of development, Muslims should establish competitive and meritocratic systems. These will require substantial socioeconomic and political reform with ideological and institutional dimensions. For such a reform to take place, Muslims need creative intellectuals and an independent bourgeoisie, who can balance the power of the ulema and state authorities.” (p. 235)