M. Taylor Fravel is Professor in, and Director of, the Security Studies Program at MIT. His 2019 Princeton University Press book, “Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949” presents a detailed, historical analysis of Chinese military strategies, as well as reasons for the shifts undertaken. The book follows a dissertation type format (reiterating the gap being filled in the academic literature) and is academic in nature. The author has a depth of knowledge of China, its history, military and strategic thinking. For those interested in a long-view, this is worth a read. For those interested in a current status, this is not your choice (more historical in focus, less contemporary). Some notes:

“The Red Army’s inferiority, and the imperative of survival, had several important implications for how it fought during this period. First, CCP forces would sometimes seek to avoid engagements altogether, retreating to remote areas and biding their time to build up their forces. Second, when employing its regular units, the CCP would seek engagements or battles of “quick decision” (suzhan sujue). Troops would maneuver to gain local superiority, attack, and then withdraw. The purpose was to destroy or “annihilate” (jianmie) enemy units, thus slowly changing the balance of forces while acquiring weaponry, supplies, and soldiers from the destroyed unit. Third, reducing an enemy’s effective strength through annihilation operations was often more important than seizing and holding territory. The Red Army would retreat from territory it had conquered if it concluded that it could not defend the area or as part of a ruse to defeat Nationalist units. Finally, the disparity in forces indicated that any conflict would be protracted in nature, as it would take a long time for parity to be reached that would allow the CCP to transition from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive.” (p. 41-42)

“In late April, senior military officers briefed Mao on the army-­wide operations meeting. In his response, Mao emphasized themes that he had already introduced in 1964. On the one hand, he agreed with building three defensive layers and not allowing the “enemy” to “drive straight in,” as in Germany’s invasion of Russia. On the other hand, he also underscored the importance of not holding territory for “too long.” For Mao, the only purpose of a fixed defense was to buy time to mobilize. Afterward, he said, “let him in, lure the enemy in deep and afterwards annihilate him.”” (p. 131-132)

“Since 1949, China’s top party leaders have emphasized that the main purpose of nuclear weapons is to prevent nuclear coercion and deter a nuclear attack. Senior Chinese leaders never viewed them as a means for fighting or winning wars. The atomic bomb was also seen as imparting other benefits, such as demonstrating China’s status as a major power in the international community and serving as a source of national pride for the Chinese people. These latter functions, however, are less central to understanding the consistency of China’s nuclear strategy across several decades.” (p. 243-244)