The authors of this book (Platias and Koliopoulos) analyze the classic work of Thucydides and make a case for its essential reading nature in grand strategy studies. This book was originally published in 2010, and a revised version was published in 2026, with some discussion on the US-China rivalry. The book does not (and the authors are clear about this) present a detailed analysis of the Peloponnesian War, it draws out grand strategy from the work of Thucydides and puts that into broader historical context. Some notes:
“The issues tackled by Thucydides have reoccurred through the centuries and remained relevant today. Organized entities, in their quest for security, still create and implement strategies similar to those employed twenty-five centuries ago. There is a thread of irony within this consistency, even as the blunders (e.g. over extension, under estimation of the enemy, etc.) are replicated throughout history. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that this trend will not persist into the future. Consequently, the writings of the Thucydides and the grand strategies contained therein are as relevant today as they were in the past, and there is no reason to believe that their relevance shall diminish with time.” (p. xix-xx)
“The Thucydidean power transition theory of hegemonic war naturally includes the growth of Athenian power but also fear; fear is prima facie evident in this much-quoted extract on the truest cause of the Peloponnesian War. Threat perception is critical in determining a state’s strategic choices, both of which are shaped by the political leadership.” (p. 36)
“The real game changer, though, was Persia. Around this time, the Spartans entered into valuable agreements with the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. Although their relationship with them was not strewn with roses (especially the one with Tissaphernes), it marked an important turning point in the war. Finally, in 407 BCE, the Spartans found a staunch ally in the Persian court through Cyrus, son of the Persian king, who was given an extensive command in Asia Minor. Persian money started flowing freely, enabling Sparta to make up for various naval reverses.” (p. 83-84)
“We are interested in instances where the enemy is presented as ‘inferior’ due to cultural, racial or other factors, but where this supposition lacks any objective foundation. Consequently, using as a starting point Thucydides’ analysis of the Sicilian expedition, we will present other cases where the underestimation of the enemy led to strategic failure and will attempt to offer some insights as to the possible reoccurrence of this theme in the future.” (p. 128)
“The popularized Thucydides’ trap employs only a single variable throughout its causal processes and quintessential prediction: the variable of power differentials. Accordingly, it constitutes a highly structural interpretation of hegemonic war that gravely oversimplifies Thucydides’ analysis on the causes of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides instead went to great lengths to provide accurate details on the crucial arguments delivered during vigorous political debates in both Sparta and Athens. This emphasis on statesmanship indicated that Thucydides was not a structural determinist; rather, he well understood the impact of political leadership on strategic choice.” (p. 145-146)
