Bruno Macaes’ 2018 book, The Dawn of Eurasia: On the Trail of the New World Order, is mostly a travelog of Central Asia with a brief geopolitical introduction. Like his other book, it does not sweeten with time (similar to another of his books I read / reviewed). In the moment interesting, but approaching a decade later less so. The interesting bits are largely from the travelog and of the socio-cultural form. Not sure I’d recommend reading in 2026 (or beyond). Notes:

“The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have actually exceeded the power of weapons in their effectiveness. Most of these are tested, age old tactics, but economic globalization and the development of deep global networks gives them greater relevance and effectiveness. The use of information can now take advantage of the internet and open new fronts of conflict, as in the case of cyber-attacks or hacking into information systems to collect and disseminate information. Other non-military tactics include the purchase of infrastructure in other states, the corruption or blackmail of foreign officials, and the manipulation of energy flows or energy prices, all of them magnified in an integrated global economy.” (p. 50)

“The truth is that there is a radical difference between the European and Chinese schemas action, one that will slowly reveal itself to the traveler. Europeans conceived an ideal model in their minds, which they then try to execute, transforming reality to make it resemble the planned model. European philosophy, starting with Plato, was focused on finding a way to bridge the distance between model and reality. For traditional Chinese thought, this was never a problem. Rather than set up a model for action, the Chinese are inclined to consider the course of events of which they are apart, allowing themselves to be carried along by the propensity of things and making the most of its consequences. Whereas Europeans see in external circumstances obstacles capable of ruining the best laid-out plans, the Chinese want to profit from them, using the favourable factors implied in the situation, exploiting them constantly and allowing them to unfold so that, for example, when one does finally engage finally in battle the opponent has already surrendered. The victorious troops begin by winning and only then engage in battle; the defeated begin by engaging in battle and only then try to win. Drawing on this tradition, modern China is developing a new constellation of political values centred on state capacity and efficiency: since policy goals are obtained from the practical situation rather than an idealized picture, their realization is seen as inevitable. The different action schemas thus seem to be fully preserved in the European and Chinese varieties of modern politics.” (p. 141-142)