

ARTICLE

Ethiopia's developmental state: A building stability framework assessment

Melisew Dejene¹ | Logan Cochrane^{1,2,3}

¹Institute for Policy and Development Research, Hawassa University, Ethiopia

²Carleton University, Canada

³Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results, School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Correspondence

Logan Cochrane

Email: logan.cochrane@gmail.com

Abstract

Ethiopia has been lauded for its economic growth and progress in human development indicators. For some, that success is rooted in the developmental state approach advocated by the government. For others, the theory of the developmental state and the practice in Ethiopia were often at odds. Up until 2018, ideas that challenged the state and its approaches were not welcome, and politicians, academics and journalists were jailed for expressing alternative views. However, this appears to have changed, and in June 2018 the Deputy Prime Minister called for debate on the developmental state model. This article explores Ethiopia's developmental state model using the building stability framework, analysing its ability to establish fair power structures, foster inclusive economic growth, develop conflict-resolution mechanisms, create effective and legitimate institutions, and enable a supportive regional environment. We find the developmental state was effective in a number of ways, but that this modality of governance appears to have passed its peak of securing advantage in Ethiopia. A shift from the developmental state to developmental democracy appears to be underway. Decision-making and economic policies need to align with this change.

KEYWORDS

building stability framework, developmental state, Ethiopia, inequality

1 | INTRODUCTION

“Ethiopia provides one of the clearest examples of a ‘developmental state’ in Africa”
(Clapham, 2018, p. 1151).

“World leaders have lauded Meles’ economic achievements without acknowledging their theoretical basis”
(de Waal, 2012, p. 148).

“Meles’s developmental state theory did not include key elements of his political strategy and action, very probably because they would have invalidated it. Indeed, in practice there were many times when his strategies contradicted his theory” (Lefort, 2013, p. 461).

The Ethiopian developmental state model has been researched by a wide range of scholars, including Clapham (2018), de Waal (2012), Lefort (2013) and Abbink (2017). The shifting political landscape since the unexpected death of former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has reignited discussions on the developmental state in Ethiopia. It is not just political change that has drawn attention to Ethiopia, however, but also the rapid and sustained economic growth (World Bank, 2017) and its relatively strong performance on the indicators set out in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), such as in health and education (UNDP, 2015). The long-term planning, use of resources and building of required capacity that enabled these changes were often rooted in the stability and authoritarian nature of the Ethiopian developmental state. On the other hand, its policies have also raised questions about human rights violations and repression (Amnesty International, 2012; Freedom House, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2015). The narratives regarding the modality of governance have varied widely, depending on which set of data, or what types of changes, are focused upon.

The stated modality of governance outlined by the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has been that of a developmental state. Since this ideological foundation was promoted, the government has not welcomed domestic debate or criticism of this approach (Oakland Institute, 2013). The question of how best to govern is crucial and timely. In 2018, however, the governmental stand on critics to its approach of governance appears to have changed. In a conference organized in June 2018 by Meles Zenawi’s Leadership Academy (named after the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi), on the theme of “Developmental State and Leadership,” Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen called for scholarly deliberations on the Ethiopian developmental state model.¹ He suggested that the country needs to better understand the benefits, opportunities and limitations of the developmental state, as it has been conceptualized, pursued and practised by the GoE. In this article, we take up this call. Specifically, we analyse the Ethiopian developmental state using the “building stability framework” (DFID, 2016) and its five aspects, namely: (a) fair power structures, (b) inclusive economic development, (c) conflict-resolution mechanisms, (d) effective and legitimate institutions, and (e) enabling a supportive regional environment.

Previous research has been conducted on the Ethiopian developmental state. Studies have investigated its origins and capacity to usher in the nation’s development needs (Clapham, 2018), explored its nature as a mode of governing (Gebremariam & Bayu, 2017), analysed its interaction and relations

¹Parts of the Meles Zenawi Leadership Academy conference were broadcast on Ethiopian Television (ETV) on June 29, 2018. Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen made these comments in a speech in Amharic, but the television station has not posted recordings of these events online, as far as we are aware.

with the peasantry (Planel, 2014), outlined its role in relation to ethnic diversity (Abbink, 2011), and assessed the manifestation of its “revolutionary” ideological base and subsequent state building (Vaughan, 2011). Routely (2012, p. 3) argues that the developmental state could usher in “a route to social justice” and/or “economic prosperity.” We analyse the Ethiopian developmental state model that, according to official statistics, enabled double-digit macroeconomic growth for the last decade (2005/2006–2015/2016) (World Bank, 2017; Cochrane & Bekele, 2018), with respect to its capacity to promote inclusive development. In part, we present this analysis by exploring the shift in governance, with the rise of a new prime minister in 2018, and comparing how this differs from the decades that preceded it.

2 | ETHIOPIAN DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

The GoE fits the developmental state mould well: strong, interventionist and vision-oriented with moderate successes in planning and co-ordinating while remaining committed to building human capital (Woldegiyorgis, 2014). Clapham (2018) argues that Ethiopia is one of the clearest examples of a developmental state in Africa. The Ethiopian manifestation of the developmental state, as conceived by Zenawi (2012), seemed to view the state as autonomous and hegemonic (in the Gramscian sense). He argued that developmental states can implement effective and appropriate policies and maintain this direction over a sustained period, without being interrupted by electoral cycles or the influence of interest groups.

Common examples of the developmental state include Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, and more recent additions include China, Rwanda, Vietnam and Ethiopia (Carothers & Gramont, 2013). These examples demonstrate that the developmental state can offer advantages by creating an environment for the government to actively direct the co-ordination of resources and execute macro-level development projects. However, a pending question is how long such advantages can last, and in what forms. Some evidence seems to suggest that unless a balance of power is allowed to emerge, such as civil society or opposition political voices, states have a tendency to become authoritarian and dictatorial, moving in the opposite direction of democratization, inclusion and participation (Dashwood & Pratt, 1999). Meles Zenawi disagreed; he argued that political parties and civil society in Ethiopia would “easily become patronage mechanisms, rather than the basis for a true associational political culture and sustainable development” (de Waal, 2012, p. 154).

The GoE has been able to use the advantages of the developmental state to foster many positive changes: healthcare services and coverage have rapidly expanded (NPC, 2015, 2017); access to education has improved at all levels (NPC, 2015); macroeconomic growth has consistently been among the highest in the world (World Bank, 2017); road and communications networks have rapidly expanded (NPC, 2017); many new (albeit controversial) infrastructure projects have been undertaken (NPC, 2016); Africa's second largest safety net is highly regarded (Berhane, Gilligan, Hoddinott, Kumar, & Taffesse, 2014); flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) continue to be high (Clapham, 2018); reported progress on the MDGs was strong (NPC, 2015); and stability was maintained in a region where this has not been the norm (de Waal, 2015). That is not to suggest that these developments are unproblematic.

The politically induced changes that these modalities of governance have enabled have also come with costs. There has been increasing repression, intolerance and marginalization (one could argue these “costs” are outcomes of a different set of political objectives regarding the maintenance of power and control, see Abbink (2011, 2017) and Lefort (2013)). A leading scholar of Ethiopian politics, Christopher Clapham, noted a general lack of attention by the international community to

Ethiopia's "very poor democratic and human rights record" (2018, p. 11). Civil society has been severely restricted (Cochrane & Betel, 2018; Sisay, 2012). The media, journalists and bloggers are closely monitored, with dissenting voices charged with supporting terrorism or committing treason (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Individuals who wish to pursue different pathways, such as by not participating in government programmes, have experienced disenfranchisement, exclusion or even imprisonment (Cafer, Willis, Shimelis, & Mamo, 2015; Cochrane & Tamiru, 2016; de Waal, 2015). When opposition political parties are allowed to form, they are strongly controlled and their leaders often detained for long periods (Abbink, 2017). Elections have been a sham, with the 2015 election resulting in a 100% win for the ruling party coalition (Clapham, 2018).

3 | BUILDING STABILITY FRAMEWORK

The building stability framework was developed in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2030 Agenda, which includes a promise to "leave no one behind". The questions raised by the Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen about the developmental state called for empirical evidence. The building stability framework is one avenue to provide such evidence, as it is a practical tool to support decision-making—as opposed to a theory-based assessment or a critical approach divorced from the challenges facing decision-makers. The framework outlines five "building blocks" that contribute to long-term stability, which enables a nation, community or region "to develop, and manage conflict and change peacefully" (DFID, 2016, p. 5). The building blocks are (a) fair power structures, (b) inclusive economic development, (c) conflict-resolution mechanisms, (d) effective and legitimate institutions, and (e) a supportive regional environment. We focus on these building blocks in this article as a means of appraising the Ethiopian developmental state. The framework does not serve all purposes, and has limitations, as outlined below. As such, this evaluation is best viewed as one of several potential approaches to assess the benefits, opportunities and limitations of this modality of governance.

Within the building stability framework, fair power structures are conceived as vital instruments of widening the base by promoting societal participation and "accountability and transparency" in strategic terms while preventing violence (DFID, 2016). Inclusive economic development conveys the idea of widening the platform for inclusive governance in the sense that the general public needs to be involved in agenda-setting and decision-making in issues that affect their lives (DFID, 2016). This runs counter to authoritarian, top-down decision-making where the consent of the governed is barely entertained. Conflict-resolution mechanisms from the building stability perspective refer to both formal and informal approaches that people adopt to deal with conflict scenarios. It also recognizes the different segments of society, including the role of women, in peace-building. The building stability framework espouses the belief that effective and legitimate institutions (both state and non-state) are prerequisites to social justice and inclusive development. Institutions ensuring the security of the public, economic stability, equity and equality in service delivery need to be in place for social justice and good governance to be enshrined. The fifth and last constituent of the building stability framework deals with the wider regional context and the capacity to forge stable and peaceful relationships, especially with neighbours. It also refers to the nation's ability to promote life-transforming activities (including trade) that minimize society's vulnerability to shocks (DFID, 2016).

We use the building blocks of this framework to assess the Ethiopian developmental state. A few points are worth noting before doing so. In the framework, the exact nature of the institutions and structures is not predefined nor are the linkages between the building blocks presented as occurring in a sequence. This is important. Our understanding of institution-building, policy and legal

development, as well as broader social change, is that these processes are adaptive in nature, responding to specific circumstances, opportunities and constraints (Ang, 2016). The framework is amenable to this view of transitioning into more peaceful, inclusive, fair and open societies, while recognizing that difficult trade-offs need to be made along the way. However, we also recognize that the building blocks reflect a particular set of assumptions, in this instance from within the UK Department for International Development (DFID). While there are some limitations, we have found that the framework is broad enough to deal with macro-level trends at the country level and that the basic premises and assumptions that led to the building blocks have a wider implication for various nations irrespective of the ideology held by its authors.

Readers may wonder why we have opted to use a framework developed for fragile states. We are not arguing, directly or indirectly, that Ethiopia is a fragile state. Rather, we believe that certain characteristics of the Ethiopian experience lend itself to this framework, which places an emphasis on stability, peacefulness, inclusiveness and long-term development. At the outset of the governance period, the new Ethiopian state emerged out of conflict, and during the 1990s it continued to experience domestic conflict (numerous disputes revolving around ethno-linguistic groups) and international conflict (the war with Eritrea 1998–2000). Ethiopia has been in a state of emergency multiple times recently, and for extended periods: from October 2016 to August 2017 and again from February 2018 until June 2018. Mass protests that have taken place since 2014 have given rise to new forms of instability (Kestler-D'Amours, 2018; BBC News, 2016). In addition to political challenges, the nation has experienced emergency events in the form of droughts, requiring millions of people to be given humanitarian aid (ReliefWeb, 2018). This does not make the state fragile; it does, however, present some features that are similar to those encountered in circumstances where the government could be characterized as having low levels of legitimacy and its citizens vulnerable to shocks.

A key limitation of this study is the normative nature of the analytical frame. There are no specific measures outlined in the building stability framework that could be applied across times and places. The framework is descriptive in nature and does not specify which metrics or indicators might best be used in its application. As a result, the framework is a guide, but results in some subjectivity. We explore each of the building blocks by way of examples. While not all the examples may be generalizable, we believe that they provide insight into the developmental state with regard to the respective issues, and allow for an examination of the benefits, opportunities and limitations of the Ethiopian developmental state. Due to these limitations, we present this analysis as one assessment approach, but also recognize the need for complementary approaches to deepen our understanding.

3.1 | Fair power structures

“Fair power structures” suggests an effective and just power-sharing scheme among elites across various political stances, fair gender representation, with implications both in the short term and long term. The presence of capable and inclusive economic and political institutions helps ensure fair power-sharing in a sustainable manner. This requires pertinent political reforms in favour of women and other marginalized groups (DFID, 2016). Fair power structures, therefore, refers to a fair and capable electoral system, political space to voice diverse views and economic space to accommodate minorities.

Before the changes of 2018, the political space available to Ethiopians was limited. The developmental state had evolved into a modality of governing that required obedience and punished dissenting voices. René Lefort, who has covered issues of this nature since the 1970s, explains that in the developmental state “orders are carried out, no matter how inappropriate or unrealistic they might be” resulting in the implementation of activities that are not working well, and the restriction of, and even

a disincentive for, new ideas emerging (2013, p. 465). The narrative of the developmental state has provided a discourse and means for the government to entrench authoritarian modes of governance, expand its control and deepen its power (Abebe, 2014). The government's guiding philosophy of "revolutionary democracy" saw the rural peasants as its base (who are conceived as "uneducated" and who fall prey to "rent seekers" and need to be "protected" by the state, rather than as being able to define their own path) (Lefort, 2013). This is contrary to the wealth of evidence showing that the inclusion of diverse groups in political spaces enables greater long-term stability (DFID, 2016).

Ethiopia has millennia of experience with authoritarian-style governance (Pankhurst, 1966). In this regard, limited opportunity for engagement in political space is not new. The latest manifestation of elitist, top-down, hierarchical rule has been implemented and justified under the banner of the developmental state (Abbink, 2017). While the ideas have much deeper origins (Vaughan, 2011), the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (d. 2012) was its leading designer and advocate. Meles described the ways in which democracy can hinder development, particularly with the short-termism that results from brief electoral cycles and shifts in policy and programming (Zenawi, n.d.; 2012). Meles did not believe that the only route to overcoming these challenges was authoritarian rule, but also believed that long-term coalitions, such as those in Japan and Scandinavia, could allow for democracy and development to operate in tandem. This was the approach preferred by Meles, who viewed the large rural population of Ethiopia as a potential means through which this stability could be attained (Gill, 2010). More importantly, however, Meles felt the particular manifestation of the developmental state in Ethiopia reflected the context within which it existed (Zenawi, 2012; de Waal, 2012). Thus, the Ethiopian developmental state, from an ideological perspective, is not opposed to democracy or open, inclusive political spaces. However, according to Meles, it was the Ethiopian context which necessitated a more authoritarian form of governance.

The DFID building stability framework assumes that democracy is the ideal mode of governance for all peoples at all times, hence its emphasis on fair elections. However, Meles challenged the idea that democracy and development must go together: "Theoretically, there is no reason to believe that democratization is a precondition of economic development. The reverse – that democratization can be the result of a certain level of economic development – appears to be more robust than the other way round, but even that in our view is not a proven fact" (Gill, 2010, pp. 169–170; Zenawi, 2012). Meles' vision of a newly developing state requires long-term economic planning and stability, and if necessary this takes precedence over democratic processes. The development that results, he argued, will then allow for democracy to flourish (Zenawi, 2012).

Meles was not alone in his ideas about democracy and development. Relying upon relatively non-democratic successes as their examples, some advocate that governance is tied to socio-economic development, without democracy as its required form (Carothers & de Gramont, 2013). Government commitment to development and strategic use of resources is the key to development, the theory advocates, rather than democracy as a form of governance in and of itself (Khan, 2007; Evans & Rauch, 1999; Booth, 2012).

In Meles' vision there would be a transition to democracy in an unstated time frame and based on unclear indicators of when and how it would occur (Meles, n.d.). When opposition parties made large, unexpected gains in the 2005 election, the hope for a stable developmental democracy diminished and it transformed into an authoritarian developmental state. In 2005, this was clear to all, but some had seen the signs much earlier. In 1994, Herbert Lewis argued that from "an initial position of great moral and political strength, President Meles Zenawi and the EPRDF have fallen back into the old Ethiopian tradition of attempting to rule single-handedly and autocratically, without consent of, or input from, the governed" (Vaughan, 2003, p. 185). Some observers had noted early on that the political space was not opening, nor were there signs of it progressively becoming more open and inclusive. Meles

believed that the country's policies ought to be determined by the GoE itself, made in its own interests and for the interests of its people first and foremost. This would be led and defended by a vanguard of the revolutionary democratic leadership who would mobilize, organize and co-ordinate all members of society (Lefort, 2013). Thus, while the foundations of the developmental state ideology did not bar open political spaces, other ideological foundations did—particularly the belief that the public was not able to determine the direction of the nation.

In addition to electoral systems and political space, the building stability framework emphasizes the importance of voice. In this regard, Ethiopia does not fare well. Freedom House (2018) ranks the country as “not free,” both in terms of press freedom and net freedom with an aggregate score of 12/100 (where 0 = least free and 100 = most free). Regarding political rights, Ethiopia also did not rank well, with a score of 4/40 (1 out of 12 for “electoral processes;” 0 out of 16 for “political pluralism and participation;” 3 out of 12 for “functioning of government”). It received a marginally better score for civil liberties, obtaining 8/60 (2 out of 16 for “freedom of expression and belief”; 0 out of 12 for “associational and organizational rights”; 2 out of 16 for “rule of law” and 4 out of 16 for “personal autonomy and individual rights”). Based on these three components—electoral system, political space and voice—the developmental state has not put forward a foundation for a stable future in terms of the building stability framework (we will deal with economic space in Section 3.2).

We believe that Ethiopian history strengthens the case for the importance of fair power structures and inclusion. In the 1960s and 1970s, there were citizen movements in Ethiopia seeking to change the governance system, with specific calls for greater justice for the rural majority (Zewde, 2014). Again, in the 1980s and 1990s, mass movements rose to challenge and change the governance system (Abraham, 1994). While the current government was being established in 1991, it has been reported that the leaders argued that the “most important achievement of the learning process has been the realization of the fundamental fact that in order for the struggle to succeed, it has to serve the democratic rights and interests of the struggling people” (Abraham, 1994, p. 13). This was echoed by US positions of the time, which are reported to have stated: “Democracy. Everything we do in the Horn should encourage the adoption of democratic methods and the practice of democracy” (Abraham, 1994, p. 16). Fighting for more inclusive governance led to democratic rights being enshrined in the Ethiopian constitution of 1995 (Abraham, 1994). One of the key causes of discontent during the military regime (1974–1991) was the inability to speak out, to point out weaknesses or to address inefficiencies for fear of being labelled as anti-government (Abraham, 1994, p. 100). For the military government, “political loyalty was valued above competence. The administration, which was made to rely heavily on control and supervision, was not efficiency oriented” (Abraham, 1994, p. 112). As a consequence, “many qualified Ethiopians were discouraged from using their potential to the fullest” (Abraham, 1994, p. 113). This authoritarian, centrist style of governing “tended to choke the process of dynamic development and progress in all spheres of society” (Abraham, 1994, p. 126). Following the second coup d'état, those who looked back at the military regime suggested that the “bottom line is that they [the military regime] should have willingly created a new structure of democracy even if that meant relinquishing power” (Abraham, 1994, p. 125).

As Clapham (2018) argues, the potential advantages offered by the Ethiopian developmental state modality of governance appear to have passed its peak of securing advantage in Ethiopia. We echo that the “critical challenge that it [GoE] faces is whether it can make the transition to a very different kind of state” (Clapham, 2018, p. 1162). We expand, however, on what Clapham envisioned this transition to entail. We believe the transition is not only a matter of a more vibrant private sector and government accountability, but that it requires a more inclusive modality of governance. As the GoE reconsiders the conceptualization of the developmental state, we highlight the critical role that a transition to more inclusive governance will play in ensuring stability and growth. This includes having a fairer and more




FIGURE 1 Falling rates of malnourishment and poverty in Ethiopia (World Bank, 2017)

Note: Percentage of people living in poverty for 2015 is an anticipated figure from NPC (2017)

transparent electoral system, opening the political space and expanding the opportunities for people to voice their concerns, ideas and opinions. However, in making these general recommendations, we do not dictate what the new modality of governance should entail or how the transition ought to occur. The question of what and how needs to be navigated and negotiated by the people of Ethiopia.

3.2 | Inclusive economic development

Inclusive economic development entails a positively growing economy with a system ensuring that benefits reach diverse groups in society. It is about the presence of capital-intensive investments in the agricultural, manufacturing and trade sectors, along with employment-creation and livelihood-promotion schemes. Fighting corruption and “illicit financial flows” is necessary for a healthy economic system (DFID, 2016, pp. 8–9).

The Ethiopian developmental state's record of economic expansion has been rapid and sustained. Since 2003, national gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates have ranged between 7.6% and 12.6% (the rates vary by source, including those provided by the World Bank and of the GoE (Cochrane & Bekele, 2018)). However, the Ethiopian government's focus and prioritization of macroeconomic growth entailed costs. The United Nations (UN) has observed that Ethiopia's development has not been inclusive (UN, 2015). Thus, the first two aspects of the building stability framework—a growing economy and shared economic benefits—do not necessarily occur in tandem. Shared economic benefits require laws and policies, and their enforcement, for pro-poor growth to have broad positive impacts.

We are not idealistic about economic growth. Ethiopia has a shortage of domestic capital and seeks foreign investment (NPC, 2016). Attracting FDI comes with trade-offs. As Meles argued, Ethiopia has few, if any, natural competitive advantages (Zenawi, n.d., 2012). Despite the need to expand the private sector, the operational space for economic development remains limited and challenging. In

terms of ease of doing business against the World Bank's 11 indicators, Ethiopia's performance is categorized as low by both global and sub-Saharan African standards (World Bank, 2018). The country stands at 174 out of 190 countries for "ease of starting business," 169 for "dealing with construction permits," 125 for "getting electricity," 139 for "registering property," 173 for "getting credit," 176 for "protecting minority investors," 167 for "trading across border," 68 for "enforcing contracts" and 12 for "resolving insolvency." The figures suggest that while GoE was keen to attract certain types of investment, it had not fostered the domestic enabling environment required (we deal with illicit financial flows in Section 3.5).

Looking into poverty in Ethiopia provides some insight into the complexity of the narrative of economic growth, shared economic benefits and inclusive economic development. Poverty is a pervasive challenge throughout Ethiopia. However, assessments of poverty vary in their approach and findings. Using 2011 data, the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative found that 71.1% of Ethiopians live in severe poverty (OPHI, 2017). The United Nations Human Development Report suggests that 67% live in severe multidimensional poverty (UNDP, 2017), whereas the World Bank and the GoE find the percentage living in poverty is roughly half that amount (see Figure 1) (NCP, 2017; World Bank, 2017). Despite a rapidly rising population, now exceeding 100 million, the trends within the available datasets suggest that the percentage of people living in poverty is declining (Figure 1). However, aggregate national data can conceal sub-national differences, with regional levels of poverty varying and their rate of reductions shifting unequally (UNDP, 2015). Furthermore, almost all of the data used by international organizations (World Health Organization (WHO), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World Bank) are primarily drawn from the government Central Statistics Agency. One area where the GoE data differs from the World Bank and the UN is on population, which potentially inflates per capita growth that supports rising GDP per capita levels. The macro-level evidence suggests that benefits are, at least to a degree, being shared, as demonstrated by falling rates of poverty and malnourishment.

While the rates of poverty and undernourishment in Ethiopia remain among the highest in the world, the progress in reducing these burdens is especially important because during this same time period the population has risen rapidly. The population has nearly tripled since 1980, from an estimated 35 million to over 100 million (UN, 2011, 2015). The rates listed in Figure 1 are percentages of the population, and thus the decline has been achieved while the population has expanded at one of the world's fastest growth rates (World Bank, 2017).

The MDGs complemented the national action to reduce the number of people experiencing poverty and undernourishment (Bluffstone, Yesuf, Bushie, & Damite, 2008; Brown & Teshome, 2007). The SDGs present a shift, however. The objectives aim to eliminate poverty and hunger, not just reduce the number of people experiencing them. Available data suggest that the authoritarian developmental state was effectively expanding the government's capacity, coverage and activities to enable those reductions through resource mobilization, stability and long-term planning. This suited the target reductions of the MDGs. Achieving the SDGs means shifting from quantity (scale, stability and resource mobilization) to quality, which demands high levels of efficiency and effectiveness as well as "leaving no one behind," in a nation where inequalities are pervasive (Cochrane & Rao, 2019; OPHI, 2017). In effect, a new approach to inclusive development is required.

Consider the inequalities that have occurred as a result of the developmental state priorities on macroeconomic growth. One of the most robust datasets that allow for data disaggregation to understand inequalities is offered by the WHO, which has been analysed by Cochrane and Rao (2019). Based on a broad set of child health indicators, they identify significant inequalities related to gender, location (rural vs. urban), economic status, educational attainment and ethno-politics. Importantly,

Cochrane and Rao highlight how these specific vulnerabilities can layer, multiplying vulnerabilities and inequalities. In another attempt to explore how these layers might be presented, Husmann (2016) mapped a set of vulnerabilities related to the marginality of social, political, economic, ecological and biophysical systems in Ethiopia. The layering of “hotspots” by Husmann shows how complex the variables and outcomes of inequality assessments can be. The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative assessed poverty by location (rural–urban and by regional state), finding significant differences (OPHI, 2017): rural poverty was four times higher than urban poverty. The study also found stark regional differences, which, given Ethiopia’s “ethnic federalism,” is not only related to geographic location but also to ethno-linguistic identities. For example, the percentage of the population living in severe poverty in Afar (79.7%) was more than double that of Harari (36.6%) and Dire Dawa (38.5%) and is much higher than Gambella (57.5%).

Seemingly aware of the challenges of the developmental state form of economic development that had become the status quo, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who came to power in early 2018, is known as a proponent of inclusive development. Reflecting on past priorities, Prime Minister Abiy suggested that there might have been a priority problem in the government’s development agenda, especially in terms of spending on mega infrastructure projects, as he thought that multi-billion dollar (USD) investments could have been used to ensure food security, by installing basic irrigation in most parts of the country.² During the live broadcast of his June briefing to the House of People’s Representatives (HPR), Prime Minister Abiy suggested that the MPs (the people’s representatives) needed to prioritize the agenda of basic irrigation in their respective communities. He stressed the priority of feeding the nation and ensuring food security, with the budgetary allocation supporting these new priorities: Prime Minister Abiy stated that “64% [of the 2018/19 budget is allocated] for pro-poor programs on education, health, water, among others”, a rate higher than other African countries (ENA, 2018). These reflections, and apparent new directions, also shed light on the past modality of governance, highlighting its limitations.

3.3 | Conflict-resolution mechanisms

Conflict-resolution mechanisms refer to modern and traditional approaches that help to solve conflicts in a peaceful manner. The DFID framework includes pre-conflict, amidst conflict and post-conflict resolution schemes such as “early warning,” “resilience building” and “citizens diplomacy and dialogue initiatives” (2016, pp. 10–11). Ethiopian conflict-resolution mechanisms, both “modern” and “traditional,” are numerous. Their processes and objectives are diverse. Bouh and Mammo write that “different cultures use a wide range of styles in managing conflict” (2008, p. 109); and the people of Ethiopia have a wealth of successful conflict-resolution mechanisms. This federal state, to a degree, uses and relies upon these diverse traditional mechanisms. However, the government also has its own formal approaches, which are more specific to the developmental state ideology.

The inter-state conflict and the long-standing tension with neighbouring Eritrea provides an example of conflict encountered by the Ethiopian developmental state. A peacekeeping mission was deployed to reduce the conflict (Cliffe, Love, & Tronvoll, 2009; Abbink, 2003a, 2003b). The UN called for Badme to be ceded to Eritrea, which was the major reason for the full-scale war. Meles and his party saw this as “legal nonsense” (Cliffe, Love, & Tronvoll, 2009, p. 154) and made no effort to abide

²Prime Minister Abiy has been very active in speaking to the media. Most of these interactions are conducted in Amharic and broadcast on television and/or radio, which are not available as transcripts or reproduced online. This poses a challenge for referencing this content. In this instance, these comments of Prime Minister Abiy were aired on Debub Radio F.M. 100.9 on June 19, 2018.

by the UN ruling or find alternatives to resolve the conflict. After a decade of the developmental state being unwilling to accept terms it did not dictate, there was fear that war may break out again. The developmental state ideology, with its people as with its neighbours, sought to force its own position upon others. This has not been an effective approach of formal conflict resolution.

Domestically, the formal justice system under the EPRDF-led developmental state in Ethiopia has been blamed for being politically biased, and even fostering conflict to serve its purposes, a point recently confirmed by former Prime Minister Tamrat Layne.³ This has won the attention of the current leadership, which set up a committee to work on holistic reforms in the justice sector (Ayele, 2018). In 2018, Prime Minister Abiy replaced prison administrators of the infamous detention facilities and prisons, including Kaliti, Shewa Robit and Dire Dawa, among others, where many human rights abuses have been reported. The current shifts identify limitations of the past approaches of the developmental state, namely the inability to resolve conflict.

The reform in the (van)guard has changed this. The new government has taken action to make peace with Eritrea, including accepting the Algiers Agreement (originally signed December 12, 2000). Credit was given to Prime Minister Abiy's more amicable approach for the thaw between the two nations (*The Economist*, 2018). Leaders of both nations made historic visits to the respective countries. Ethiopian and Eritrean Airlines resumed flights to each other's nations (Reuters, 2018; Mohammed, 2018). Prime Minister Abiy also extended his government's willingness to co-exist peacefully with all neighbours with a diplomatic and economic relationship of a “win-win approach” focused on “security in the Horn of Africa” (Government Communication Affairs, 2018). From the building stability framework perspective, the conflict-resolution capacity of the EPRDF developmental state was not particularly successful—either domestically or internationally—except in those cases when it was able to “resolve” conflict by force, imposing its decision or position. The change in political direction in 2018 shows how these limitations (with regard to conflict resolution) were entrenched within the broader ideology. Calling into question the ideology has allowed for a calling into question of a wide range of issues, resulting in more collaborative and negotiated approaches to conflict resolution.

3.4 | Effective and legitimate institutions

Legitimate institutions are “public authorities” that have the consent of the governed with the umbrella notion of “state legitimacy.” Core issues here are security, rule of law, justice and an effective “macroeconomic management” that need the contribution of both state and non-state actors to be ensured (DFID, 2016, pp. 12–13). Naqvi (2018) argues that the success of the East Asian developmental states should not necessarily amount to adopting such systems, particularly where corruption is prevalent and government capacity is not strong. In this regard, there is overlap between the experience of the developmental state, as Naqvi (2018) suggests, and the building stability framework, in that institutions require capacity and consent to be effective.

As argued in the SDG report by the GoE, effective and legitimate institutions are not only a matter of governance (NPC, 2017). They are also a matter of technical capacity. This is not a new narrative; “capacity building” and “good governance” have long been used by the GoE to capture resources and further its own agenda of building the machinery it believes is required for a “successful” developmental state (Fantini, 2013). The closing of civil society alongside a rise of “capacity building”

³Former Prime Minister was interviewed on Nahoo TV on August 2, 2018 (titled: *Min ye lalu? What Are They Saying?*). The television channel has not posted the content online, nor a transcript of the interview. Copies of the interview are available on YouTube. We have not included links to those re-postings, as they do not appear to have been posted with the permission of Nahoo TV.

interest in international assistance has enabled the government (at multiple, shifting levels) to ensure it directs donor funding to advance its agenda, which has included controlling the state apparatus and its personnel.

When the current government formed as a coalition in the early 1990s, it promised three major reforms in the areas of: (a) devolution of power in line with ethnic federalism, (b) pluralism in party formation with promises of a free and fair electoral system, and (c) liberalizing the economy (Vaughan 2015, cited in Harald Sande Lie & Mesfin, 2018, p. 9). It remains questionable, however, how far the developmental state has come in achieving these reforms (Lefort, 2013; Abbink, 2017). Electoral systems were discussed in Section 3.1, here we focus on the institutions and the extent to which they are run with the consent of the governed.

Harald Sande Lie and Mesfin (2018, p. 4) observed that “under a ‘democratic developmental state’ it can be difficult to manage competing and diverging concerns.” Obtaining consent of the governed is challenging when there are competing and divergent concerns. It is further compounded when there is an ideological foundation that posits a vanguard ought to protect the people and decide on their behalf. When protesters began taking to the streets in 2014, the developmental state apparatus did not have a mechanism to address those concerns, other than attempting to reject them with force (Kestler-D'Amours, 2018; *BBC News*, 2016). We argue that Ethiopian history makes it clear that non-inclusive governance systems result in ineffective programmes and services, and thus are at the root of the concerns of the majority. The systemic inequalities and authoritarian modes of control were one of the main rallying cries for mass mobilization against the current government (as it was in the 1960s and 1970s as well as in the 1980s and 1990s). In 2016, the country witnessed widespread protests. The heavy-handed approach to the citizenry ought not be understood as an anomaly, but a continuation of the authoritarian nature of the developmental state, especially in the post-2005 era—their protest a clear manifestation of their lack of consent.

As of September 2018, Prime Minister Abiy has not disavowed the developmental state ideology or approach. However, he is undoubtedly taking a new path. The shift is rooted in the lack of consent of the governed and the resulting lack of legitimacy of government institutions. The government has been introducing various nationwide reforms, including the release of political prisoners. The justice system had been implementing controversial laws including the anti-terrorism proclamation that resulted in the detention of many opposition political leaders and journalists. The new government has also introduced reforms in the intelligence community, who had been accused of being a repressive instrument of the ruling party. Prime Minister Abiy promised a democratic election in 2020. Effectively, the lack of consent and failure of institutions are being redressed. The recent changes highlight where the developmental state was not succeeding as a governing modality and seeking a new way forward that is rooted in popular support and consent.

3.5 | Supportive regional environment

This building block refers to the capacity of nations and communities to take advantage of the external environment and to handle shocks. Apart from positive relations with neighbouring and transnational state and non-state actors, this component of the building stability framework includes the capacity to tackle terrorism and other violent “terrorist ideologies,” transnational criminal activities and “illicit financial flows” (DFID, 2016, pp. 14–15).

The Horn of Africa is not a part of the world where regional peace and stability have predominated. Two of Ethiopia's neighbours are effectively failed states (South Sudan, Somalia). Eritrea has, until recently, hosted rebels seeking to fight the GoE. At numerous points over the last decade, Ethiopia has been involved in the fight against terrorism within Somalia. There are also resource-sharing conflicts,

particularly over the Nile river, as Ethiopia is the source of an estimated 80% of the water (Harald Sande Lie & Mesfin, 2018). With the launch of Africa's biggest hydropower dam, with a capacity expected to generate over 6000 MW, Egypt had expressed strongly negative views about the government and at points has viewed Ethiopia as a threat to its national security (Lie, 2010; Whittington, Waterbury, & Jeuland, 2014). Tensions could have been lessened had there been more proactive negotiations (Whittington et al., 2014). The ideological foundation of the developmental state approach was one in which the modality of engagement was assertive and aggressive, which does not bode well for negotiations and collaborative agreement.

Ethiopia fought a war with Eritrea from 1999 to 2000, which was preceded and followed by lower levels of conflict and hostility. The long-standing conflict cannot be traced to the developmental state; however, the same ideological foundations that posed challenges for resolving conflict with Egypt also presented barriers for conflict resolution with Eritrea. Ethiopia's peace engagement with neighbouring Eritrea in 2018 ended the two-decade-old conflict, which could be a boost for regional stability (Okeowo, 2018).

With regard to fighting terrorism, Ethiopia has been a valuable partner in the region. For example, it helped in investigating a terrorist attack in Djibouti and has engaged Al-Shabaab in Somalia on numerous occasions (US State Department, 2017). However, this has come alongside repression of Ethiopian Somalis (Hagmann, 2012), and the Muslim community more broadly (Fasil, 2015). Ethiopia's involvement in African Union's (AU) peacekeeping mission in Somalia and South Sudan are also instances of its effort to ensure a supportive regional environment. These military initiatives are well aligned with the approach of using might to enforce what the vanguard believes is best.

Illicit financial flows and corruption have been a challenge for Ethiopia, and are not specific to the developmental state experience. A panel organized by the AU, led by the former South African President Thabo Mbeki, named Ethiopia as the second largest source of illicit financial flows in Africa (Fekade, 2015). Between 1970 and 2008, Ethiopia lost an estimated USD 16.5 billion (Fekade, 2015), presenting a significant lost opportunity. Corruption also exerts significant negative pressure on the economy. Transparency International (2014) described Ethiopia as a country that suffers from "high level bribery." In 2017, the Corruption Perception Index of the country ranked 107 out of 180 countries (Transparency International, 2014). While these are indeed problems, the ideological stance of the developmental state are not enablers per se. Based on the ideology, one might expect assertive and aggressive activity against illicit financial flows and corruption. However, the heavily controlled and restrictive financial sector did not enable more transparent financial flows, and in this regard did not provide viable alternatives.

4 | CONCLUSION

"Rural poverty cannot be solved through the instrumentality of the state alone, but requires the active engagement of the poor themselves. Democratizations, property rights that are inclusive of the poor, enabling citizens' groups, including poor people's organizations: these, individually or in ensemble, help to expand human agency, the agency of the poor in particular." (Rahmato, 2008, pp. 276–277)

The developmental state was effective at creating stability and laying the groundwork for the institutions, infrastructure and capacity required. However, building the blocks of a stable nation for the long term—fair power structures, inclusive economic growth, conflict-resolution mechanisms, and effective, legitimate institutions, enabling a supportive regional environment—is not going to occur within

the developmental state ideology. We suggest that technical solutions by a top-down government have reached their limits of what a strong developmental state can offer, particularly in translating the resource investments into building effective and legitimate institutions.

Fair power structures require a willingness to include voices beyond the elite vanguard, and value those voices as important and legitimate. It requires laws, policies and processes that offer opportunity for everyone, including the opportunity to offer dissenting opinions. Processes of inclusion run counter to the narrative of the elite vanguard protecting the populace. These foundations fostered an inability to compromise, whether with neighbours in the international community or with opposition political parties domestically. The result was that while the developmental state was effective at building, it was not so successful at fostering effectiveness and legitimacy. The development endeavours with a focus on macroeconomic growth need to go in tandem with inclusive economic development. Ensuring this requires capable and effective institutions to foster a system of governance that could offer pertinent conflict-resolution mechanisms within the nation and wider regional environment.

Ensuring legitimacy requires addressing the factors that have sown discord; one of the greatest alterable causes is reducing systemic inequalities (compared to less controllable factors, such as climate change, agro-ecologies or international markets). The barriers of systemic inequality and authoritarian governance will continue to limit progress unless these systems are transformed. These systemic inequalities, we argue, are linked with the modality of governance (while recognizing that government is not the only means of fostering inequality).

In 2017, the situation looked bleak. It appeared that widespread conflict might emerge. We have argued that effective and efficient activities to ensure inclusive development require challenging and transforming the underlying causes of inequalities and supporting the emergence of more inclusive forms of governance. Reforms by the new leadership signal improvement, if not divergence from the previous version of the developmental state as conceived by Meles.

While Ethiopia does not have a history of inclusive, participatory governance, the transformation of governance made in Tanzania shows that such change is possible (Dashwood & Pratt, 1999), although more recent trends in Tanzania suggest these shifts may not necessarily be sustained. Transforming the modality of governance does not necessarily mean multi-party democracy, it does, however, require a willingness to make significant political and ideological change. We also believe that, given the opportunity, Ethiopians are eager to engage, participate and collaborate. There are numerous examples where citizens have already demonstrated this eagerness, when given the space to engage. The Ethiopian Women Lawyers' Association succeeded in having the Family Law, Penal Code and Nationalities Law revised to remove systemic inequalities and discrimination that existed in old codes (Cochrane & Betel, 2018). It could be that the dawn of multi-party democracy is rising in Ethiopia, as various opposition parties are coming home from exile.

Systemic, transformational change to governance will not be easy. Shifts of this magnitude never are, as privileges are contested and hierarchies are challenged. The need for change became increasingly apparent as highly confrontational interactions between the government and the people escalated until the resignation of former Prime Minister Hailemariam and the accession of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The new leadership confirmed its commitment to wider and holistic reforms including fair and democratic elections (Giorgis, 2018). We believe Ethiopia can find its own pathway to governance that is more inclusive. One road could be paved with new approaches and opportunities for engaged citizens alongside government willingness to become more inclusive and responsive. However, this is not the only way political change could occur and based on Ethiopian history, it is potentially the most unrealistic. Yet, it is an Ethiopia that people are demanding throughout the country. It is also the optimistic vision of Ethiopia that the new prime minister is promoting—one which implies the sunset of the developmental state and the dawn of democratic development.

REFERENCES

- Abbink, J. (2003a). Badme and the Ethio-Eritrean border: The challenge of demarcation in the post-war period. *Africa*, 58(2), 219–231. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40761693?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
- Abbink, J. (2003b). Ethiopia–Eritrea: Proxy wars and prospects of peace in the Horn of Africa. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 21, 407–425. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0258900032000142446>
- Abbink, J. (2011). Ethnic-based federalism and ethnicity in Ethiopia: Reassessing the experiment after 20 years. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 5, 596–618. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2011.642516>
- Abbink, J. (2017). *A decade of Ethiopia: Politics, economy and society 2004–2016*. Leiden: Brill.
- Abebe, S. G. (2014). *The last post-Cold War Socialist Federation: Ethnicity, ideology and democracy in Ethiopia*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Abraham, K. (1994). *Ethiopia – From bullets to the ballot box: The bumpy road to democracy and the political economy of transition*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press.
- Amnesty International. (2012). Ethiopia: The 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation as a serious obstacle to the promotion and protection of human rights in Ethiopia. Amnesty International's written statement to the 20th Session of the UN Human Rights Council (18 June–6 July). Retrieved from the Amnesty International website: <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/16000/afr250072012en.pdf>
- Ang, Y. Y. (2016). *How China escaped the poverty trap*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Ayele, B. (2018). Council Arise to Reform Anti-Terrorism, Media Law. Retrieved from the AllAfrica website: <https://allafrica.com/stories/201807030771.html>
- What is behind Ethiopia's wave of protests? (2016, August 22). *BBC News*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36940906>
- Berhane, G., Gilligan, D. O., Hoddinott, J., Kumar, N., & Taffesse, A. S. (2014). Can social protection work in Africa? The impact of Ethiopia's productive safety net programme. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 63, 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.1086/677753>
- Bluffstone, R., Yesuf, M., Bushie, B., & Damite, D. (2008). Rural livelihoods, poverty, and the Millennium Development Goals: Evidence from Ethiopian survey data (EfD Discussion Paper No. 08). Retrieved from the Environment for Development website: <http://www.efdinitiative.org/publications/rural-livelihoods-povertyand-millennium-development-goals-evidence-ethiopian-survey>
- Booth, D. (2012). Development as a collective action problem: Addressing the real challenges of African governance. Retrieved from the Overseas Development Institute website: <https://www.odi.org/publications/6869-synthesis-report-development-collective-action-problem-addressing-real-challenges-african-governance>
- Bouh, A. M., & Mammo, Y. (2008). Indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms on range lands in Somali Regional State, Ethiopia. *Nomadic Peoples*, 12(1), 109–121. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43123815>
- Brown, T., & Teshome, A. (2007). Implementing policies for chronic poverty in Ethiopia. Retrieved from the Chronic Poverty Research Centre website: http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/CPR2_Background_Papers_Brown-Teshome.pdf
- Cafer, A. M., Willis, M. S., Shimelis, B., & Mamo, M. (2015). Growing healthy families: Household production, food security, and well-being in South Wollo, Ethiopia. *Culture, Agriculture, Food and Environment*, 37(2), 63–73. <https://doi.org/10.1111/cuag.12053>
- Carothers, T., & de Gramont, D. (2013). *Development aid confronts politics: The almost revolution*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Clapham, C. (2018). The Ethiopian developmental state. *Third World Quarterly*, 39, 1151–1165. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1328982>
- Cliffe, L., Love, R., & Tronvoll, K. (2009). Conflict and peace in the Horn of Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*, 36(120), 151–163. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240903086485>
- Cochrane, L. (2017). Strengthening food security in rural Ethiopia (Doctoral dissertation). The University of British Columbia.
- Cochrane, L., & Tamiru, Y. (2016). Ethiopia's productive safety net program: Power, politics and practice. *Journal of International Development*, 28, 649–665. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3234>
- Cochrane, L., & Bekele, Y. W. (2018). Contextualizing narratives of economic growth and navigating problematic data: Economic trends in Ethiopia (1999–2017). *Economies*, 6(4), 64. <https://doi.org/10.3390/economies6040064>

- Cochrane, L., & Betel, B. B. (2018). Pathways of legal advocacy for change: Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association. *Forum for Development Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2018.1534752>
- Cochrane, L., & Rao, N. (2019). Is the push for gender sensitive research advancing the SDG agenda of leaving no one behind? *Forum for Development Studies*, 46, 45–65. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2018.1427623>
- Dashwood, H. S., & Pratt, C. (1999). Leadership, participation, and conflict management: Zimbabwe and Tanzania. In T. M. Ali & R. O. Matthews (Eds.), *Civil wars in Africa: Roots and resolution* (pp. 223–254). Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- de Waal, A. (2012). The theory and practice of Meles Zenawi. *African Affairs*, 112(446), 148–155. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ads081>
- de Waal, A. (2015). *The real politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, war and the business of power*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- DFID. (2016). Building stability framework. Retrieved from the Department for International Development website: <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5968990ded915d0baf00019e/UK-Aid-Connect-Stability-Framework.pdf>
- DHS. (2006). Ethiopia: Demographic and health survey 2005. Retrieved from the Demographic and Health Surveys Program website: <https://www.dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr179/fr179%5B23june2011%5D.pdf>
- ENA. (2018, July 6). Allocating huge budget for pro-poor program creates opportunity to sustain economy: PM. Ethiopian News Agency. Retrieved from the <https://www.ena.et/en/2018/07/06/allocating-huge-budget-for-pro-poor-program-creates-opportunity-to-sustain-economy-pm/>
- Evans, P., & Rauch, J. E. (1999). Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of 'Weberian' state structures on economic growth. *American Sociological Review*, 64, 748–765. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2657374>
- Fantini, E. (2013). Developmental state, economic transformation and social diversification in Ethiopia (ISPI Analysis No. 163). Retrieved from the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale website: <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/developmental-state-economic-transformation-and-social-diversification-ethiopia-7650>
- FAO. (2014). Qualitative research and analyses of the economic impacts of cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa: Ethiopia country case study report. Retrieved from the Food and Agriculture Organization website: <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4276e.pdf>
- Fasil, M. (2015, August 3). An Ethiopian court jailed Muslim leaders, activists to lengthy terms. *Addis Standard*. Retrieved from <http://addisstandard.com/an-ethiopian-court-jailed-muslim-leaders-activists-to-lengthy-terms/>
- Fekade, B. (2015, February 15). Ethiopia: Panel names one of Ethiopia top sources for illicit financial flow. *The Reporter*. Retrieved from the AllAfrica website: <https://allafrica.com/stories/201502090215.html>
- Freedom House. (2018). Freedom in the world: Ethiopia profile. Retrieved from the Freedom House website: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/ethiopia>
- Gebremariam, F. M., & Bayu, A. M. (2017). Ethiopia: A Democratic Developmental State? *ILIRIA International Review*, 7, 153–170.
- Gill, P. (2010). *Famine and foreigners: Ethiopia since Live Aid*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Giorgis, H. (2018). Abiy Ahmed Meets the Ethiopian Diaspora. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from <https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/08/abiy-ahmed-meets-the-ethiopian-diaspora/566591/>
- Government Communication Affairs Office. (2018, July). PM Abiy Ahmed's first 100 days. Retrieved from <http://www.gcao.gov.et/web/en/-/pm-abiy-ahmed-s-first-100-days>
- Hagmann, T. (2012, July 11). Supporting stability, abetting repression. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/opinion/abetting-repression-in-ethiopia.html>
- Human Rights Watch. (2015). 'Journalism is not a crime': Violations of media freedom in Ethiopia. Retrieved from the Human Rights Watch website: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/21/journalism-not-crime/violations-media-freedoms-ethiopia#>
- Husmann, C. (2016). Marginality as a root cause of poverty: Identifying marginality hotspots in Ethiopia. *World Development*, 78, 420–435. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.024>
- Kestler-D'Amours, J. (2018, February 20). Ethiopia: Mass protests 'rooted in country's history'. *Aljazeera*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-country-history-180219130441837.html>
- Khan, M. H. (2007). Governance, economic growth and development since the 1960s (DESA Working Paper No. 54). Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/working-paper/governance-economic-growth-and-development-since-the-1960s>

- Lefort, R. (2013). The theory and practice of Meles Zenawi: A response to Alex de Waal. *African Affairs*, 112(448), 460–470. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adt021>
- Lie, J. H. S. (2010). Supporting the Nile Basin Initiative: A political analysis ‘beyond the river’ (Desk review study commissioned by NORAD). Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/2243972/Supporting_the_Nile_Basin_Initiative_A_Political_Analysis_Beyond_the_River
- Mohammed, O. (2018, August 4). Eritrean Airlines starts regular flights to Addis, improving relations: Minister. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-eritrea-airlines/eritrea-airlines-starts-regular-flights-to-addis-improving-relations-minister-idUSKBN1KP0CX?il=0>
- Naqvi, N. (2018). Finance and industrial policy in unsuccessful developmental states: The case of Pakistan. *Development and Change*, 49, 1064–1092. <https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12424>
- NPC. (2015). *MDG report 2014 – Ethiopia*. Addis Ababa: National Planning Commission.
- NPC. (2016). *Growth and transformation plan (GTP) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2015/16–2019/20)*. Addis Ababa: National Planning Commission.
- NPC. (2017). *The 2017 voluntary national reviews on SDGs of Ethiopia: Government commitments, national ownership and performance trends*. Addis Ababa: National Planning Commission.
- Oakland Institute. (2013). Development aid to Ethiopia: Overlooking violence, marginalization, and political repression. Retrieved from the Oakland Institute website: <https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/development-aid-ethiopia>
- OPHI. (2017). *OPHI country briefing 2017: Ethiopia*. Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative. Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Okeowo, A. (2018, August 2). Will the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia finally deliver peace to their people? *The New Yorker*. Retrieved from <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/will-the-leaders-of-eritrea-and-ethiopia-finally-deliver-peace-to-their-people>
- Pankhurst, R. (1966). *State and land in Ethiopian history*. Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies.
- Panel, S. (2014). A view of a bureaucratic developmental state: Local governance and agricultural extension in rural Ethiopia. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8, 420–437. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2014.922745>
- Rahmato, D. (2008). *The peasant and the state: Studies in agrarian change in Ethiopia, 1950s–2000s*. Addis Ababa: Custom Books.
- ReliefWeb. (2018). Ethiopia: Drought 2015–2018 [Web page]. Retrieved from the ReliefWeb website: <https://reliefweb.int/disaster/dr-2015-000109-eth>
- Reuters. (2018, July 19). Tearful reunions as Ethiopia-Eritrea flights resume. Retrieved from the Reuters website: <https://www.reuters.com/news/picture/tearful-reunions-as-ethiopia-eritrea-fli-idUSRTX6BY6O>
- Routely, L. (2012). Developmental states: a review of the literature. *ESID Working Paper No. 03*. ISBN: 978-1-908749-07-9
- Sisay, A. Y. (2012). CSO law in Ethiopia: Considering its constraints and consequences. *Journal of Civil Society*, 8, 369–384. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2012.744233>
- An unexpected embrace: Ethiopia and Eritrea put an end to two decades of conflict (2018, July 10). *The Economist*. Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/07/10/ethiopia-and-eritrea-put-an-end-to-two-decades-of-conflict>
- Transparency International. (2014, October 6). Transparency International data shows Ethiopia suffers from high levels of bribery. Retrieved from the Transparency International website: https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/transparency_international_data_shows_ethiopia_suffers_from_high_levels_of
- UN. (2011). World population prospects: The 2010 revision. Retrieved from the United Nations website: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/publications/world-population-prospects-the-2010-revision.html>
- UN. (2015). World population prospects: The 2015 revision. Retrieved from the United Nations website: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/publications/world-population-prospects-2015-revision.html>
- UNDP. (2015). Human development report 2015: Work for human development. Retrieved from the United Nations Development Programme website: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2015-work-human-development>
- UNDP. (2017). Ethiopia: Human development indicators. Retrieved from the United Nations Development Programme website: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ETH#>
- US State Department. (2017). Country reports on terrorism 2016. Retrieved from the United States Department of State website: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/>
- Vaughan, S. (2011). Revolutionary democratic state-building: Party, state and people in the EPRDF's Ethiopia. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 5, 619–640. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2011.642520>

- Whittington, D., Waterbury, J., & Jeuland, M. (2014). The Grand Renaissance Dam and prospects for cooperation on the Eastern Nile. *Water Policy*, *16*, 595–608. <https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2014.011b>
- Woldegiyorgis, A. (2014). The Ethiopian developmental state and its challenges. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2512907>
- World Bank. (2017). Ethiopia [Data set]. Retrieved from World Bank website: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/ethiopia>
- World Bank. (2018). Doing business 2018: Reforming to create jobs—Ethiopia. Retrieved from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/824081509690919602/Doing-Business-2018-reforming-to-create-jobs-Ethiopia>
- Zenawi, M. (n.d.). African development: Dead ends and new beginnings. Preliminary draft. Retrieved from <http://www.meleszenawi.com/african-development-dead-ends-and-new-beginnings-by-meles-zenawi/>
- Zenawi, M. (2012). States and markets: Neoliberal limitations and the case for a developmental state. In A. Noman, K. Botchwey, H. Stein, & J. E. Stiglitz (Eds.), *Good growth and governance in Africa: Rethinking development strategies* (pp. 140–174). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zewde, B. (2014). *The quest for socialist utopia: The Ethiopian student movement c. 1960-1974*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.

How to cite this article: Dejene M, Cochrane L. Ethiopia's developmental state: A building stability framework assessment. *Dev Policy Rev*. 2019;00:1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12414>