Published by I.B. Tauris, "New Military Strategies in the Gulf: The Mirage of Autonomy in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar" (2023) by Jean-Loup Samaan offers a unique analysis of the changing military directions of the Gulf (focusing on those three nations). There are many books that do a poor job covering the region, this one is a unique contribution and is well researched, supported with insider perspectives (former educator in UAE at military school and NATO advisor). In addition to military history and modern developments, the author critiques common claims and draws less-than-favorable assessments of the aspirations (for example, assessing it as: "a top-down reform process relying on foreign expertise... engendering the de facto Westernization of local armed forces" (p. 37)). Lots of interesting parts, a few:

"This book tells the story of how, in the 2010-20 decade, three Gulf states - Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar - embraced new foreign and defence policy's that no longer relied exclusively on western security patronage. These states increasingly asserted their own agendas at the regional level, first diplomatically and economically, and then militarily. In other words, they launched a quest for their strategic autonomy." (p. 3)

"I posit that the current state of Saudi, Emirati, Qatari armed forces evidences a discrepancy between the aspirations of local rulers and the implementation of their policies. Specifically, my study shows that gulf decision-makers still heavily rely on western assistance in all the major sectors of defence policy, from military education and training to arms procurement." (p. 7)

"… at the strategic level, isomorphism implies the adoption of fundamental beliefs and ideas on how these states envision and define their security. This distortion was also salient in the way Western instructors in Saudi, Emirati or Qatari schools relied on numerous examples drawn from Western military history. For example, Gulf officers were asked to study Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War or the evolution of the US counter-insurgency doctrine but much less so their own experience of war." (p. 50)

"… the Washington Post reported after an investigation relying on US intelligence sources that the hacking of Qatari websites had in fact been ordered by the UAE government. The claim was immediately denied by Emirati officials. In the weeks preceding the crisis, the hacking and the subsequent anti-Qatar campaign on social networks played such a role in building a momentum for the blockade that it shed light on the Gulf use of medias and social networks for strategic purposes." (p. 113)

"… the critical parameter of Gulf military policies remains - and will remain for the near future - their anchoring in the Western orbit. Changing the fundamental relationship between Gulf and Western military partners could lead to uncharted territories, especially if these changes are unilaterally and unevenly decided in each of the Gulf states (for instance, if the UAE dismantles this partnership while Qatar maintains close proximity with US armed forces)." 

The United Arab Emirates as a global donor: what a decade of foreign aid data transparency reveals

Open Access article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21665095.2021.1883453 or here https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21665095.2021.1883453

Abstract: The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become a leading contributor of foreign aid, in terms of percentage of gross national income as well as in total amount. Historically, Emirati aid was opaque, and little was known about the foreign aid portfolio. This changed after 2009 when the UAE began to submit detailed, project-level data to the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. Based on a decade of aid transparency, this article carries out an examination of the political economy of aid provided by the UAE, comparing its portfolio to other donor countries. Particular attention is paid to analyzing three primary recipients of its aid (Egypt, Serbia and Yemen) and the implicit motivations driving those decisions. The majority of Emirati aid to these three countries was granted as general budgetary support, often in tandem with efforts to achieve political, economic and/or military aims. Based on the findings, an evaluation is made regarding Emirati narratives of South-South cooperation and its seeking of mutual benefit as well as critiques put forward within the literature countering this. In addition to critically assessing the details of an under-researched aid portfolio, this paper highlights areas for further study to deepen our understanding of the UAE's foreign aid. 

With the potential for an end, or at least easing of tensions, in the GCC, it seems an interesting moment to look back and see what the perspectives were when the crisis started. "The Gulf Crisis: The View from Qatar" (2018), edited by Miller, gives a set of perspectives on a wide range of issues, with contributions written in the first year after the UAE, Saudi, Bahrain and Egypt cut ties and closed borders as well as airspace with Qatar. A few notes:

One of the most dramatic shifts for Qatar has been increasing domestic production, notably for food products, but also for a wide range of other commodities that were previously primarily imported. For example, a national food security plan re-oriented the food system, with targets set for domestic production of specific food commodities (notably fresh milk and poultry are to be 100% domestic supply by 2023) and explicit objectives to diversify the sources of imported items. Dr. Ansari (p. 33) says the events will "forever be viewed as a turning point for Qatar's food system", looking back from 2021, this rings just as true today as it did then.

The long-term investment in culture, arts and sport, which long preceded the events of 2017, appear to have had multiple positive benefits for Qatar. One component relates to diversifying the economy, while another acts as a means to build linkages with partners around the world (while FIFA is well publicized, international sporting events are regularly held in Doha). 

Partly due to the external pressures of internationalization (particularly FIFA), during this period Qatar departed from the employment and labour standards from the region, such as making it easier to transfer employers and introducing a higher minimum wage. Although long in the planning, during this period Qatar also moved forward plans to introduce elected members of government (advisory council), which are scheduled for 2021. These, and a number of other domestic policy issues, were transformed during this challenging period, arguably making Qatar much better placed (e.g. investment, residency rights, work) in relation to its neighbours following the crisis (see chapter by Dr. Mitchell). However, the economic growth and investment is not outward, another domestic shift during this period was the development of domestic entrepreneurship. Dr. Tok (p. 39) argued the crisis was an opportunity to foster domestic entrepreneurship. While it is unclear how new businesses will manage in the long term if/when trade fully re-opens, what is clear is that there is a much greater recognition and support for Qatari-produced products.

One interesting contribution of this volume covers a much less reported on aspect of the crisis: its manifestation across Africa. A number of other nations followed suit (Chad, Comoros, Mauritania and Senegal cut diplomatic ties, while Djibouti, Gabon and Niger downgraded their ties). This is covered by Harry Verhoeven (p. 136-144) and should be an area of increasing focus, as the influence of the Gulf expands. As a non-tech expert, the extent of cybercrime (and its central role in the Gulf Crisis), at least in my circle, appears to attract far less attention than it should (see p. 109-118 by Joseph J. Boutros).