Part of the Reading Ethiopia series

This book was written by Lovise Aalen in 2011 and it is unfortunate that I had not read this book until now, given the geography and topics covered (apologies Dr Aalen if you are out there). The author says this book explores a unique experiment in institutionalizing the politics of ethnicity: the implementation of ethnic based federalism in Ethiopia from 1991 onward" (p. vii). The data in the book comes from the mid-2000s for a doctoral study (supervised by Tronvoll). Two in-depth case studies cover Wolaita and Sidama, which have become critical cases for the topic of politics and ethnicity (the author correctly identifies the future fracture points of ethnofederalism). Still well worth a read. A few notes:

"There is no doubt that the TPLF as a guerrilla movement was inspired by the Stalinist theory of nationalities. After taking power, the front continued to believe that ethnicity was a natural and efficient principle on which to organize and mobilize the people as long as this mobilisation was led by a strong party. A clear indication that the TPLF continued to be inspired by the Soviet system and that the Soviet understanding of the 'nationality question' is that the Ethiopian Constitution of 1995 gives 'nations, nationalities, and peoples' the right to succession in Article 39. No other current constitution incorporates the right." (p. 35)

"Both the Wolayta and the Sidama initially welcomed the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, which began in 1936. The colonizers abolished the hated landlord system and did not expropriate the land, and they thus appeared as liberators from the Amhara oppressors. In Sidama, people rose up against their lords and collaborated with the Italians when they realised that the Amhara lords could not stand against the foreign invasion. When the colonizers left in 1941, the Sidama tried to organize Military to prevent the return of the Amhara rulers. This led to retaliation from the Amhara: people who had taken the Italian side were imprisoned, their cattle were confiscated, their land was seized. The Sidama today talk about this period as the second terror (hulettegna sherber) and recall that it renewed the suffering of what they call the first terror, which occurred when the Amhara came to Sidama for the first time during the reign of Menelik." (p. 75)

"The constructivist approach to ethnicity, however, underlines that we should not take for granted that ethnic groups are cohesive and that members of subgroups of the ethnic group always act in the same way. Every ethnic group is a collection of different subgroups with different opinions and alliances. Moreover, identities other than ethnic, notably by class or gender, and generation, shape the political mobilisation in a given community." (p. 127)

"I will argue, however, that in the Ethiopian context it is not actors within the ethnic groups alone who have revived the discriminatory practices. Rather, the EPRDF's promotion of ethnicity as the major organizing principle of society has combined with its pragmatic power politics in local communities to reproduce rather than challenge the traditional hierarchies." (p. 144)

"At the end of the 1990's the Sidama Development Programme, with support from Irish Aid, built a road on the Sidama side, along with a bridge, a health center and a school. This was done in order to give the Sidama population in the area, including those of the eight mender, a better supply of the services. The Sidama on the eastern side of the river started sending their children to the newly built school, but this was disrupted when the school was destroyed by parties to the conflict in 2002. These Improvements in Infrastructure on the Sidama Sid have been interpreted in ethnic terms: the Wolayta have argued that the developments were personally initiated by the regional president at that time, Abate Kisho from Sidama, as a part of campaign to disfavour the Wolayta." (p. 167)

"As the current political regime favors ethnic organisation of politics and has drawn administrative boundaries along ethnic lines, political boundaries along ethnic lines, political actors find that it pays to sharpen ethnic divides. Before ethnic-based self-rule can be implemented it has to be made clear which people belong to which group (identity discrimination) and which territories each group should be entitled to govern (territorial demarcation). This process may increase people's awareness of ethnic differences and may also create a potential for territorial disputes between groups. Groups of people that did not previously look upon themselves as ethnic entities may press such claims in order to gain their own administrative units. Thus the launch of ethnic self-administration has led to increased political mobilisation on ethnic grounds." (p. 179-180)

Compared to other regions, there are few books about the GCC, and specifically Qatar. I try to track new publications and I came across "Kinship, State Formation and Governance in the Arab Gulf States" by Scott J. Weiner (2022), which was published by Edinburgh University Press. The book is covers Kuwait, Oman and Qatar (the latter less so compared the others) and is the author's doctoral work. The conclusion (somewhat disjointedly) adds Somaliland and Iran. The basis of the book is fifty interviews. At several points the book is repetitive. The audience is not for experts of those moderately familiar with the region, much of the context is basic socio-cultural introduction for each country (as a PhD thesis, expected, as an academic press book, less so). The book does pose an interesting question about comparative state building in the GCC, but it largely presents descriptions rather than an answer. One quote:

"This book theorises a path-dependent process of state building that occurs in three stages. In stage one, the rule builds or expands physical and bureaucratic infrastructure. In stage two, it uses this infrastructure to extend the bureaucratic authority from the urban center to non-urban areas. In stage three, the state creates a nationalist idiom which underpins a narrative of the state's heritage and political origins." (p. 46-47) 

We tend to assume that democratic processes, norms and structures are 'sticky' and rarely 'die'. The cases we might think about are those that ended due to war and conflict, with the emergence of dictatorship in the form of fascism or military rule. In "How Democracies Die" (2018) Levitsky and Ziblatt provide a clear counter-narrative, and one seemingly much more relevant than the war and conflict narrative. In sum, that counter-narrative is: "Since the end of the Cold War, most democratic breakdowns have been caused not by generals and soldiers but by elected governments themselves. Like Chavez in Venezuela, elected leaders have subverted democratic institutions in Georgia, Hungary, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine. Democratic backsliding today begins at the ballot box" (p. 5). It is democratic processes themselves being used to unravel themselves.

Many commentaries of late have focused on the power of the people, and their vote, as a way to ensure democratic processes reflect what people expect of them. Levitsky and Ziblatt suggest that there is more to understanding why democratic governance has been sticky in the American context: political parties, and specifically the gatekeeping involved in those political parties that kept outsiders and radicals out. To be clear, these political party gatekeeping processes were not democratic: "candidates were chosen by a small group of power brokers who were not accountable to the party rank and file, much less to average citizens" (p. 38). Oddly, non-democratic (often elite run and non-transparent) processes are held up as a key source for democratic continuity.

The authors also point out a gradual change of norms: "Democracies work best – and survive longer – where constitutions are reinforced by unwritten democratic norms. Two basic norms have preserved America's checks and balances in ways we have come to take for granted: mutual toleration, or the understanding that competing parties accept one another as legitimate rivals, and forbearance, or the idea that politicians should exercise restraint in deploying their institutional prerogatives" (p. 8-9). They continue, later in the book: "Some polarization is healthy – even necessary – for democracy. And indeed, the historical experience of democracies in Western Europe shows us that norms can be sustained even when parties are separated by considerable ideological differences. But when societies grow so deeply divided that parties become wedded to incompatible worldviews, and especially when their members are so socially segregated that they rarely interact, stable partisan rivalries eventually give way to perceptions of mutual threat. As mutual toleration disappears, politicians grow tempted to abandon forbearance and try to win at all costs. This may encourage the rise of antisystem groups that reject democracy's rules altogether. When that happens, democracy is in trouble." (p. 116)

When I first came across Nicholas Coghlan's "Collapse of a Country: A Diplomat's Memoir of South Sudan" (2017), I passed it up. Memoirs can be interesting, but not always great (unless you are interested in the day to day activities and experiences, often without in-depth contextualization). However, while on route to South Sudan myself, I read the book, and highly recommend it. It is a fascinating read, and quite well contextualized in issues well beyond a typical memoir.

On governance, one of the journalists he speaks with explains "Yes, there is a tendency towards dictatorship in South Sudan," he admit. "But you know what? This will never be a dictatorship like Eritrea's. To be a dictator you have to be efficient and you have to have a vision. Neither apply in our case." (p. 47).

On conflict resolution: The resolution of the Jonglei Crisis had followed a well-worn pattern. A Big Man becomes dissatisfied with the status quo and finds himself unable to get his way by peaceful means. He takes to the bush and assembles an armed militia. He creates mayhem. In the end, he accepts an offer of cash and promotion and comes back in. Until next time. The practice often brought peace in the short term, but over the medium to long term, It encouraged and rewarded rebellion." (p. 70). See also De Waal (2015) on this point. There are some challenging reflections on the future, such as Coghlan's reflection that "it would take more than a generation for South Sudan to get over this situation [lived experiences of conflict]" (p. 32). As the peace negotiations enter into new rounds, with similar faces making few compromises, the prediction continues to be a likely one.

On aid and priority setting: "A particularly interesting finding of the in-country surveys was that most communities identified inter-ethnic reconciliation as their top priority for donor support (this with the caveat that polling and surveys are notoriously problematic in South Sudan). I was intrigued but not surprised by this after years of observing the civil war, which as often as not pitted southerners against each other rather than against northerners. But for newcomers to South Sudan, this seemed aberrant. More to the point, how could you achieve "reconciliation" and how did you establish benchmarks? When we huddled with the government to reach a consensus over priorities, reconciliation shifted near the bottom of the list" (p. 108).

On the (lack) of accountability: "A very large convoy of World Food Program trucks carrying mainly food supplies north to the POC camp in Bentiu was hijacked and looted near Mundri, Western Equatoria State. When they were released, the drivers described their assailants as armed and uniformed. There was no doubt about where at least three of the trucks were taken; GPS tracking showed them to be inside the SPLA barracks in Yei. WFP supplied all donors with a list of the value of their goods that had been stolen; in the case of Canada, the total was US$ 300,000. But WFP insisted that we not a make public statement, let alone press the government for an explanation. They were more concerned with getting the trucks back in tact – forget the food seized – and not endangering further their already difficult relationship with the government." (p. 199)

On Canada and staffing challenges (and some self-reflection): "It seemed that the younger generation in the Canadian foreign service were not motivated by what had attracted me: the prospect of travel to exotic places, a whiff of danger and excitement, and being a big fish in a small pond. They preferred the classic "cushy" posts – London, Rome, Washington – if they wanted to go abroad at all." (p. 197)