Nov
30

Foreign Intervention in Africa – The Cold War

Elizabeth Schmidt is a professor of history at Loyola University. The following thought provoking quotes are taken from her 2013 book "Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror."

The context:

  • "For many outsiders, the word Africa conjures up images of a continent in crisis, riddled with war and corruption, imploding from disease and starvation. Africans are regularly blamed for their plight. They are frequently viewed as being intolerant of ethnic and religious differences but accepting of corruption and dictatorship. They are often presumed to be unwilling or unable to govern themselves. This book challenges such popular myths. By examining the historical roots of contemporary problems, the book demonstrates that many of the predicaments that plague the continent today are not solely the result of African decisions but also the consequences of foreign intrusion into African affairs." (1)

Flipping slides and changing support:

  • "African-superpower alliances in the Horn were complex and fluid. In the early 1970s, the United States helped sustain Emperor Haile Selassie's feudal order in Ethiopia while the nominally socialist military regime of Mohamed Said Barre in Somalia was supported by the Soviet Union. However, by 1978, after a military coup in Ethiopia had brought a self-proclaimed Marxist regime to power and Somalia had attempted to annex Somali-inhabited territory in Ethiopia, Moscow and Washington had switched sides." (143)

Framing interventions in Africa:

  • "Pervasive anticommunism in some quarters often led to a misunderstanding of nationalist movements. Radical nationalism was frequently confused with communism – or viewed as an equal threat to Western interests. Fear of communism – real or imagined – led the U.S. government to support many unsavory dictatorships. Although the dictatorships were pro-Western and anticommunist, they did not promote the freedom and democracy that Washington claimed to endorse. In the case of Southern Africa, a region valued for its strategic location and minerals and home to a significant population of white settlers, conflicting American interests led the United States to reinforce, rather than oppose, colonialism and white-minority rule." (24)
  • "The inadequacy of the Cold War framework did not stop the white-minority regimes from attempting to employ it. The ruling powers in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa all sought to present their opposition to equal rights in Cold War terms. In doing so, they gained support from some constituencies in the United States and other Western countries." (135)

On privilege and power:

  • "Although they had come at the request of the Congolese government, the UN forces were under Western authority. Western priorities included first and foremost the protection of white lives and property and the resolution of the crisis to the benefit of Western political and economic interests." (61)
  • "Guinean nationalist leader, Sekou Toure, responded, "We prefer poverty in liberty to riches in slavery." On referendum day, 94 percent of Guinean voters cast their ballots for independence. For Guinea, the consequences of that choice were devastating, as France retaliated physically and economically, and the new country's attempts to establish relations as a coequal partner were rebuffed." (174)

Cold War legacy:

  • "Although the conflicts in the Horn had deep local roots, they were exacerbated by the Cold War interventions of the superpowers and their allies. Without the vast quantities of weapons provided by the United States and the Soviet Union, local conflicts would not have escalated into regional ones that took an enormous toll in the human life. The militarization and destabilization of the Horn during the Cold War are at the root of the conflicts that continue to devastate the region in the twenty-first century." (144)
  • "…during the period under consideration (1945-2010), foreign intervention in African generally did more harm than good. External involvement often intensified conflicts and rendered them more lethal. Even humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, which were weakened by inadequate mandates, funding, and information and undermined by conflicting interests, sometimes hurt the people they were intended to help" (230)

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Nov
25

Foreign Intervention in Africa – The Colonial Legacy

Elizabeth Schmidt is a professor of history at Loyola University. The following thought provoking quotes are taken from her 2013 book "Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror."

The context:

  • "For many outsiders, the word Africa conjures up images of a continent in crisis, riddled with war and corruption, imploding from disease and starvation. Africans are regularly blamed for their plight. They are frequently viewed as being intolerant of ethnic and religious differences but accepting of corruption and dictatorship. They are often presumed to be unwilling or unable to govern themselves. This book challenges such popular myths. By examining the historical roots of contemporary problems, the book demonstrates that many of the predicaments that plague the continent today are not solely the result of African decisions but also the consequences of foreign intrusion into African affairs." (1)

On Economics:

  • "Although this book focuses upon foreign political and military intervention in Africa, the problems that plague Africa today cannot be properly understood if the impact of foreign intrusion into African economies is ignored. Unequal exchange between African commodity producers and industrialized countries is a legacy of the colonial era that has contributed to the deep impoverishment of African populations. The inequality inherent in these economic relationships persisted after political independence in a system that has been characterized as neocolonialism. In the words of Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, neocolonial states had "all the outward trappings of international sovereignty," while their economies and political programs were "directed from outside." (9)

On the colonial legacy:

  • "Strategically placed Belgian administrators would remain in the Congo after independence, along with 1,000 Belgian officers commanding the 25,000-man Congolese army. Although the new political officeholders would be Congolese, power would remain in Belgian hands. The interests of the United States, the dominant Cold War power, were largely compatible with these objectives. The Eisenhower administration supported the installation of a government friendly to its NATO ally and one that would guarantee the continued exploitation of Katanga minerals for Western benefit." (58-59)
  • "Britain and France responded as old-style imperial powers. Threatened by Nasser's approach to decolonization, they were determined to overthrow him. Britain worried about the vulnerability of its royal protégés and its enormous investments in the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, whereas France was concerned about Nasser's support for nationalists who were fighting an independence war in Algeria and his growing influence in other parts of Francophone Africa. Britain and France thus initiated plans for a military attack. For this attack they enlisted the support of Israel, which was motivated by its own regional concerns. The United States, in contrast, saw the conflict as one rooted in the Cold War. In Washington's view, the refusal of Western powers to embark on programs of decolonization played into Soviet hands. Moreover, any threat to Egypt would strain relations with Arab countries and jeopardize American access to oil." (40)
  • "In Madagascar, French troops, eventually numbering 30,000, waged a brutal counteroffensive. Employing scorched-earth tactics, they bombed villages, burned fields, and killed livestock. Untold numbers of civilians were tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. By the time the insurrection ended in November 1948, some 90,000 Malagasies – approximately 2 percent of the population – had died as a result of violence, hunger, and disease." (170)
  • "Between 1890 and 1941, Eritrea was an Italian colony. Following Italy's defeat by Britain and its allies in the 1940-41 East Africa Campaign, Eritrea became a British protectorate. When World War II ended, the UN was charged with disposing of Italy's African colonies. It determined that Libya and Somaliland would be granted independence, while Eritrea would be joined in a federation with Ethiopia, despite significant popular sentient in Eritrea for independence. Although the Soviet Union, a number of Arab states, and other UN members also favored Eritrean independence, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that American strategic interests took precedence over Eritrean popular opinion. In consequence, no referendum was held." (157)

Assassination and Coup d'état:

  • "To implement the final assassination plan, high-level Belgian officers ordered Lumumba's transfer to Katanga, where he would be turned over to his enemies. Brussels was concerns that the incoming Kennedy administration might be more sympathetic to Lumumba than the Eisenhower administration, which has instigated plans for his assassination. Hence, Belgian military and intelligence advisors, with CIA connivance, pressed Mobutu to surrender Lumumba to Moise Tshombe's secessionist forces, who had vowed to kill him. On January 17, 1961, three days before Kennedy's inauguration, Lumumba was brutally tortured and executed at the hands of Tshombe's men – in the presence of Belgian officers who commanded the secessionist army and where under the authority of the Belgian Defense Ministry." (64-65)
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