

At-Issue

Farmers Buying Guns: The Impact of Uncertainty and Insecurity in Rural Ethiopia

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Abstract: After years of widespread protest, Ethiopia experienced a historic change of leadership in 2018. In addition to the positive changes that took place, the political reforms also brought forth uncertainty and, in some places, resulted in greater insecurity. This At-Issue article focuses upon one issue, the illegal weapons trade, which has expanded in scale and geography in the months and years that followed the historic change. Drawing upon interviews with people who purchased weapons during this time period in rural areas of one region, we present insight regarding the motivations driving the demand for weapons. We critically examine the proposed reasons for the expansion of the weapons trade in Ethiopia and reflect on what the trends in 2020 may imply for the future of insecurity and conflict in the country. While some reforms have taken place to regulate and control the illegal weapons trade, these initiatives have been limited in scope. Given the rise of uncertain and insecurity, and the potential for even more deadly violence with more people purchasing weapons, transformative federal and regional leadership is required to address the illegal weapons trade.

Keywords: Ethiopia, Illegal Weapons Trade, Security, Arms Trafficking

Introduction

Sitting with his semi-automatic, Russian-made Kalashnikov in hand, Geta explains that everyone in his area has guns. For some, it is considered a cultural rite. “When a woman gives birth to a baby boy,” Geta explains, “we buy a gun in the name of that child and keep it until the child is old enough to carry the weapon.”¹ The guns are not merely cultural items, however. According to Geta, one must be prepared to defend himself and his family, and avenge a death if needed. Reflecting on traditions of the past under his thatch roof, Geta explains that killings such as those that occurred in the past are less common today because formal and informal institutions intervene to prevent cycles of violence from occurring. Yet, like many others, Geta recently bought a weapon. “I bought this gun for 100,000 ETB [US\$3,000] from smugglers in 2018. To pay for it, I used my savings and sold two cattle and horse.” When asked why he felt he needed it, Geta explained that “if I delayed to catch the registration, I would be the last one without a gun in this village. We do not know when we may need this gun to defend ourselves from unexpected attacks. Since the change took place, our region has been put under pressure from different anti-Amhara political actors.”²

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In 2018 Ethiopia began a transformation. Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn resigned and the current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took the leadership of the ruling coalition.³ Significant political, economic, and social changes have taken place since that transition in early 2018.⁴ We focus upon the illegal trade of weapons, an issue that has raised concern but has not been widely written about beyond media reports of police activity. This At-Issue raises the alarm that the illegal weapons trade plays in contributing to the threat of escalated, or even widespread, violence.

The illegal weapons trade is not a problem specific to Ethiopia. Why we raise it as a reason for particular concern is the apparent expansion of its scale occurring in parallel with ethnic, religious, and political conflicts.⁵ As reported by the International Crisis Group, this includes: multiple instances of intercommunal clashes resulting in hundreds of deaths and millions displaced; ethnically and religiously motivated violence as well as attacks on religious institutions; political assassinations; and political tensions with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River, amongst others.⁶ Understanding the way these changes are perceived, particularly in rural communities, is important but often under reported (with the focus more on urban centers, particularly Addis Ababa).

Before delving into the specific drivers for people to purchase illegal weapons, we first present a summary of some of the key events that have been reported in the media in order to contextualize the scale of the illegal weapons trade. Due to challenges of finding people who are willing to speak about this topic, one which may result in their imprisonment, our qualitative data is limited. In selecting this region, we do not implicitly or explicitly imply that this issue is specific to, or most problematic in, that region. We explore the causes of instability and uncertainty by drawing upon experiences of people in rural Amhara who have purchased such weapons. While our interviews took place in Amhara, that is not to suggest that the trade only exists there, but rather is a product of the networks of trust we have in order to be able to conduct interviews on this sensitive subject. It is also worth noting that as we finalized this At-Issue article the global pandemic is creating new forms of uncertainty and instability, the consequences of which are yet to be seen. The global pandemic is creating new forms of uncertainty and instability, the consequences of which are yet to be seen (this article was written before the conflict in Tigray and does not reflect the consequences of it).

Sociopolitical Context of Study Area

The administrative boundaries in Ethiopia's federal system are, at least in part, drawn along ethnic lines. In some regions (Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Sidama, Somali, Tigray) there is one dominant ethno-linguistic group, while other regions are more diverse (Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harari, SNNP). There are minorities in every region (e.g., Agew in Amhara, Irob in Tigray) as well as demographic minorities due to administrative boundaries (e.g., Oromo in Afar, Amhara in Oromia). In addition to ethno-linguistic diversity, the country is home to religious diversity (Orthodox/Protestant/Catholic Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Traditional Faiths) as well as livelihood diversity (pastoralism, settled agriculture, shifting cultivation, urban industrial and service employment). These diversities result in a wide range of interests, needs, and demands, such as upon resources and land. Our aim is not to recount the history of conflict in Ethiopia or the Amhara region, only to recognize that conflict has been present, and

continues to be present. We also recognize that in certain cultures possessing a weapon is a source of pride, having deep historical roots. Within this context, however, we argue that what has been occurring in the last few years with regard to the weapons trade is a new trend. The scale of the trade (described in the following section), combined with rising insecurities, warrants much more attention.

Broader Scale of Illegal Weapon Trade

Particularly since mid-2018 onward, there have been reports of large caches of weapons being seized by the police and intelligence services in Ethiopia. While the reported scale is alarming, the news media reports are not representative of the entirety of weapons that have been seized.⁷ Furthermore, the extent of the illegal weapons trade is far greater than what is captured by the police (a fact also acknowledged by the police).⁸ While we do not aim to list every weapons seizure that has taken place since mid-2018, in order to present a picture of the kinds of arms trafficking that have been reported, we present a selection of a few key incidents:

- June 2018: 1,000 weapons, 80,000 rounds of ammunition, and US\$10 million cash seized.⁹
- October 2018: 97 AK-47s and 295 handguns discovered in Amhara inside an oil tanker after it overturned, reportedly coming from Sudan.¹⁰
- November 2018: 50 AK-47s and a grenade launcher were seized in Debre Birhan.¹¹
- January 2019: 498 handguns seized in the residence of a police commander in Bahir Dar.¹²
- February 2019: Four machine guns, 46,000 rounds of ammunition, and US\$47,000 seized in Addis Ababa as well as 43 AK-47s and 1,300 rounds of ammunition in Amhara.¹³
- March 2019: Two containers holding over 18,000 handguns seized, as well as 106 AK 47s seized outside of Addis Ababa.¹⁴
- July 2019: 15 AK-47s and 7,800 rounds of ammunition seized in Afar.¹⁵
- September 2019: 49 AK-47s and 53,921 bullets seized in Afar, originating from Yemen as well as 497 handguns along with 46,000 rounds of ammunition seized in Amhara, originating from Sudan as well as 2,600 daggers on route to Addis Ababa.¹⁶
- October 2019: 71 AK-47s and 2,221 handguns were seized in Amhara, being transported in an oil tanker from Sudan.¹⁷
- December 2019: 449 handguns were seized in Bahir Dar.¹⁸

With these reports, we gain a sense of the scale: container loads and full trucks. We also learn about the diverse reported origins of the trade: old weapons and ammunition from other conflicts (Yemen, South Sudan, and Sudan) as well as new weapons, particularly Turkish-made handguns. In the above list we focused on larger shipments, which appear to then be disbursed and sold in smaller sets. As evidence for this, another network of smaller, localized traders, can also be seen in news media reports.¹⁹ Little is known about the networks operating the international and domestic weapons trade, or at least little is being shared by the police and intelligence agencies (with some exceptions, such as the detailed television documentary on the container shipment of 18,000 handguns). Our data does not offer insight into the supply chain. Our interviews were at the purchasing end of the trade network, interviewee knowledge of where weapons came from and how they arrived in their community were largely speculative. Without romanticizing the past, and based on limited data, media reports suggest that the scale

of the illegal weapons trade since 2018 has been operating at a scale that is much greater, and occurring over wider geographic spaces, than what has been experienced over the last three decades. Various law enforcement agencies, parliament, and the prime minister have expressed similar views, which has resulted in the introduction of strict new laws against illegal gun ownership (up to three years imprisonment) and arms trafficking (up to twenty years imprisonment).²⁰ In 2020, a digital monitoring system was introduced to help control the movement of weapons in the country and more easily identify illegal ones.²¹

Examining the Rise of the Weapons Trade

The news media have put forward a range of reasons why there is such a demand for weapons: traditions and cultures of holding weapons; self-defence; organized crime; establishment of armed militias; political and ethnic mobilizations; and foreign interests seeking to destabilize, amongst others.²² The police reporting we have cited provides indications that many of these motivations are occurring simultaneously. The consequences for arms trafficking (before the criminal code reform in 2020) did not act as a deterrent (with sentences being only in months), while the financial appeal of engaging in the trade was significant as individual weapons sold for thousands of dollars.²³ While we do not have information from the profiteers or smugglers of the illegal weapons trade, our findings are in agreement with Asnake Kefale in his assessment that while carrying a weapon is a traditional practice in some parts of the country, the rise of the illegal weapons trade appears to be rooted in a rising sense of uncertainty and insecurity combined with questionable trust that people have in the authorities' abilities to maintain peace.²⁴

In order to obtain some answers about what is driving the demand for illegal weapons, we spoke with individuals that have purchased such weapons in central and southeastern Amhara. Given the sensitivity of the topic, the identification of interviewees drew upon pre-existing networks and established trust. We present their stories using pseudonyms and without identifying information. At the outset, we specifically sought to better understand the demand for weapons, and these interviews provide us with the ability to examine their narratives and experiences to do that. As earlier noted, our focus on Amhara offers insight, but should not be interpreted as suggesting that the illegal weapons trade, or the issues the interviewees raise, are limited to that region. Given the limited number of interviews we were able to conduct, and the limited geographic coverage, these interviews provide glimpses into experiences and rationales, but are not representative of the trade.

To begin, we return to the rural village in central Amhara in the home of Geta, whose story we opened with. He explained that gun ownership is common, recalling that his family purchased weapons during the last government, the military Derg period (1974-1991) as well. Regarding motivations to purchase weapons in recent years, Geta worries about what he perceives as a long-running, concerted effort to weaken the Amhara people. Over the decades, Geta explains, this has included resettlement and villagization programs, which relocated Amhara people to other parts of the country, making some of the Amhara into minorities elsewhere in the country. Disconnected from their land and people, they became weak and vulnerable. This is evident to him now, he states, as those Amhara living in Oromia and SNNP regions have "lost their property and lost their lives, while the government is not able to protect

them, or does not want to protect them. As people are displaced, we need weapons to protect ourselves, our land, and our assets against armed groups.”²⁵ This too, for Geta, is not entirely new. He draws explicit links between the past attacks known to occur between different ethnic groups and the current violence and crime perpetrated against Amhara.

For those Amhara who feel they have been marginalized by the government, and because of that perception have developed a sense of resentment toward it, the grievances run across decades. There are issues raised regarding the territoriality of Amhara sovereignty, border disputes, and territorial integrity, such as in Wollo and Gondar as well as Welkait in Tigray region. These concerns are put forth alongside fears of potential land take-overs and the potential for the forced dislocation of Amhara, such as the alleged plans for a ‘Greater’ Tigray.²⁶ Amongst those who hold these feelings there are accusations that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)-led government that came to power in 1991 actively marginalized the Amhara people.²⁷ Some suggest that the Amhara National Democratic Movement (now merged into the Prosperity Party) was acting in federal, or even Tigrayan, interests not on behalf of the people of the region.²⁸ Widespread accusations were raised about some 2.5 to 5 million Amhara that ‘disappeared’ from the federal government census, altering the formula for calculating federal budgetary transfers.²⁹ The allegations go as far as claiming that the TPLF-led Ministry of Health orchestrated a forced sterilization campaign as part of a genocidal campaign against the Amhara.³⁰ Since the political changes of 2018 and the rise of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, some argue that the marginalization has continued with the increasing conflict in Amhara towns intensifying this sentiment.³¹

In another rural village, Gashaw explains that he purchased a semi-automatic weapon for US\$3,600. To get such a significant sum, he sold his cattle. He declared: “I own this weapon to defend myself against any aggression that might arrive on the doors of the Amhara people, as we are witnessing in the northern parts of the country. We are not fighting the government, even if we have been put at a disadvantage by it, it is wrong to fight the government because it may entirely collapse.”³² Gashaw legalized his weapon by obtaining a certificate for it, offered via a time-limited registration process by the local government (*kebele*) during 2018-19. Others we spoke to did similarly. This process required the payment of fees, which all the interviewees complained were very high. Through this certification process, the illegal weapons trade was being legalized by local structures of government. Local authorities benefited by obtaining the fees paid as well as by strengthening the voluntary security sector. Due to the lack of trained police in these rural communities, the holders of newly certified weapons also serve as voluntary units.

In rural villages in eastern Amhara we heard similar stories. Saed complained of people in the neighbouring Afar region, who he felt had easier access to weapons and ammunition, due to, in his assessment, much more open certification processes for legally holding weapons. People from the Afar region, carrying such weapons, bring their animals to graze in Amhara areas. Saed now carries a semi-automatic Russian-made AK-47 (costing him US\$2,000) and a handgun, “only for defending myself, not to attack anyone else” he clarifies. These purchases used up all his savings, which he had collected over the years from the sale of agricultural products from his farm. This purchase was also supported by remittances sent from a family member working overseas. For Saed, the need for weapons was driven by local issues: conflict

between Amhara practicing settled agriculture and the Afar who practice a (semi)pastoral livelihood, with disputes emerging about grazing land and access to water, as well as with Oromo (e.g. in Oromo Nationality Zone in Amhara).

Similarly, in southern Amhara, the push to acquire weapons was driven by local issues: fears of attacks by members of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) around the Oromo Nationality Zone, as Mohammed explains. He had never owned a weapon before his recent purchase, which he complained had a greatly inflated price—just four years ago the cost was a quarter or a fifth of the current rate, he explains. This raises many questions about an opaque trade, but suggests that despite the increased volume of trade, demand for weapons is increasing at even faster rate, pushing up prices. To purchase his gun, he paid smugglers US\$2,500. “I have no faith in the government to protect us or disarm the OLF fighters, so I had to obtain a weapon before they come to my home.”³³ Mohammed explained that it is widely understood in their village that fighters have been recruited by the OLF and are stationed in Amhara—including, he believes, fighters who own machine guns. It is they, Mohammed explains, who are the cause of recent conflicts.

One of the rural ‘returnees’ to Amhara we spoke to was Hailu, who spent years working as an agricultural laborer in another region. He purchased an old manual rifle and a new Turkish-made handgun from smugglers, costing around US\$1,500 and US\$300 respectively. All of his family members have weapons, Hailu explains, many of which were paid for by the savings they obtained through seasonal or long-term migration work as laborers. Some of his family members relied on overseas remittances to help finance weapons purchases, including Hailu’s brother. With bullets costing around US\$1 each (then 31 ETB), Hailu plans to sell one of his goats to ensure he has a sufficient supply. According to the local security office in one of the communities we visited, the southeastern areas of Amhara that border the Afar region experience high levels of arms trafficking.³⁴ While the trade is lucrative, the punishments in the area are low—the weapon is confiscated and a fine of US\$2 is levied. Frustrated, the security officer explains that “weak regulation has brought arms trafficking” and suggests the need for stronger regulation, such as higher age restrictions as well as higher fines for the use of weapons by underage individuals, including when they fire weapons at festive events, such as weddings.³⁵ As was noted by the farmers, the security officer complained that the certification process of weapons differed between Afar and Amhara regions, creating a situation that fosters a lack of trust in the government. Additionally, he noted, the time-limited period for legal certification in Amhara created a situation of high demand within a short window, and therefore the price of weapons on the illegal market increased substantially, as did the financial incentives for trafficking.

Not all people are new holders of weapons. Some, like Kedir, have illegally held one for a long time. It is only now, he explains, when there was a chance to certify the weapon and carry it legally that he brought it out for certification. Kedir explained that he was not interested in the Turkish-made handguns that have appeared for sale in the area: “they are of poor quality, and stop functioning after firing just a few rounds. This is just a way for people to lose their money.”³⁶ For Kedir, the rush to acquire weapons is driven by rising tension due to political instability, which is combined with a sense of victimization amongst the Amhara and fears of future attacks. None of the people we interviewed in these rural communities have had official

training on the use of the weapons that they hold. However, they were all confident with their informal shooting experience and held a shared sentiment that “everyone knows more than the local policeman, or at least the same as him.”³⁷ This collective sense has raised fears for Kedir. He worries that all these new weapons purchases may result in accidental injuries and deaths or may result in the escalation of existing conflicts. While taking a more critical perspective, Kedir still felt that “having a gun in Amhara is good. We can defend ourselves from external attackers. The war-monger speeches from Tigray (TPLF) make us feel insecure. If the government fails, we should be ready to defend ourselves, the country and maintain stability.”³⁸

Discussion

Whether it be localized conflicts with deeper roots, or conflicts that have emerged in the last two years, the feeling of uncertainty and experience of instability have driven people to purchase weapons illegally. Change brings about uncertainty. The transition that has occurred over the last two years, undoubtedly with roots many years deeper, have wrought uncertainty and instability. Yet for Amhara people generally, that change was largely welcome. Activists from Amhara had for decades campaigned on the idea that the federal system that based administrative districts around ethno-linguistic settlement patterns was an anti-Amhara construct. That was partly because substate nationalist ideology in Ethiopia had always had a sizeable anti-Amhara component, as immortalized in Walleign Mekonnen’s “On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia” in 1969:

What is this fake Nationalism? Is it not simply Amhara and to a certain extent Amhara-Tigre supremacy? Ask anybody what Ethiopian culture is? Ask anybody what Ethiopian language is? Ask anybody what Ethiopian music is? Ask anybody what the "national dress" is? It is either Amhara or Amhara-Tigre!! To be a "genuine Ethiopian" one has to speak Amharic, to listen to Amharic music, to accept the Amhara-Tigre religion, Orthodox Christianity and to wear the Amhara-Tigre Shamma in international conferences. In some cases to be an "Ethiopian", you will even have to change your name. In short to be an Ethiopian, you will have to wear an Amhara mask (to use Fanon's expression). Start asserting your national identity and you are automatically a tribalist, that is if you are not blessed to be born an Amhara.³⁹

In 1991 the TPLF took power at the vanguard of the EPRDF, a Marxist-influenced revolutionary movement, which caused considerable concern among Amhara political circles. As the new ethno-linguistic-based federal state took shape in the early 1990s, areas that were formerly part of the core Amhara provinces—Shewa, Gojjam, Wollo and Gondar (Begember)—became part of other regions—Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia and Tigray—thus leading to Amhara claims of dispossession. These narratives, amongst others already discussed, fuelled an Amhara nationalist counter-narrative: far from being Ethiopia’s most privileged people, they are actually of the most marginalised and oppressed. This narrative relates not only to concerns about the perceived injustice suffered by Amhara region and its inhabitants, but also, as explained by Geta, about the suffering of Amhara minorities in other federal states. Violence and marginalization of this type are not specific to Amhara, but also experienced by them. An everyday form of exclusion of minorities emanates from the decentralized policymaking of

language for administration and education, which poses barriers for non-speakers. Minorities also lack political representation. In 2020, these concerns are more heightened than ever with Amhara facing attacks in West Arsi Zone of Oromia and also facing evictions and being involved in sporadic small-scale conflict in Benishangul-Gumuz region.⁴⁰

Since the June 2019 assassination of the Amhara president by loyalists of his Amhara nationalist security chief, Asaminew Tsige, political uncertainty has pervaded Amhara. Neither the Prosperity Party (PP) nor the relatively new National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) command widespread support, and there is increasing fragmentation, whether at the scale of competition between politicians from the main former provinces (Wollo, Gondar, Shewa and Gojjam) or at a more grassroots level where local militia leaders at times hold sway. With ethno-nationalist opposition to Prime Minister Abiy growing, is it likely that tension between the defenders of the multinational order and Ethiopian nationalist activists will increase.

The other key dynamic is the TPLF's refusal to join the PP and the standoff between Tigray's government and Prime Minister Abiy's administration over the former running a regional election in defiance of federal authority. The dispute carries the risk of conflict, or punitive measures by the federal government such as cuts to federal transfers, which has the potential to empower Tigrayan nationalists agitating for secession. Additionally, the Amhara PP leader called for the areas in Tigray claimed by Amhara to be excluded from the TPLF's regional poll, although this did not occur. If Tigray was to begin secession procedures as a result of the dispute with Addis Ababa, which ultimately would lead to Raya and Welkait being taken out of Ethiopia, it is likely that conflict would ensue with Amhara region or at least with Amhara militia.

All of these risks are compounded by Amhara party political dynamics, as the NaMA tries to increase its influence through a relatively strident ethno-nationalism, while the Amhara PP strives to present itself as a somewhat autonomous unit—not beholden to an Oromo party chairman who some Amhara nationalists portray as a stalking horse for Oromo hegemony. The result is the potential for escalating attempts of outbidding between PP and the opposition, which is likely to continue to stir tensions with Oromo and Tigrayan nationalists, as well as Gumuz defending Metekel Zone in Benishangul-Gumuz region against the irredentist claims of Amhara nationalists. Ultimately, unless a new political settlement emerges in Ethiopia, the volatility, and ensuing uncertainty and instability, will continue to trickle down to increasingly fearful, and increasingly well-armed communities.

The government has not neglected the issue of illegal weapons trade and some regional state governments have sought to regulate it through certification systems. Punishments for transporting, selling, and holding illegal weapons have been increased. A digital monitoring system was introduced to support the tracking of registered weapons and identification of illegal ones. However, these changes do not match the scale and scope that the current threats to peace and stability demand. The legal and criminal changes are important, but are ineffective without enforcement. The perverse incentives (financial and security) at the local level need to be addressed by coordinated federal and regional state leadership. The fears emanating from instability and insecurity are inflaming tensions, further escalating conflict as well as acting as a driver of demand for weapons. While balancing the powers of regional state governments, the federal administration must lead efforts to harmonize policies across regions, lest policy

incoherence result in power imbalances that turn disputes into violent conflicts. Similarly, these drivers of insecurity and instability will continue unless the root causes of these conflicts (political, ethnic, religious, resource-based) are addressed. The rise of insecurity and instability, combined with the prevalence of weapons, has the potential to escalate violence conflict. The situation demands stronger leadership from the federal and regional governments, equivalent to the threat posed.

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Notes

1 Interview, rural farmer in Amhara region, January 2020.

2 Interview, rural farmer in Amhara region, January 2020.

3 For additional context, see, for example: Fisher and Gebrewahd 2019.

4 For a summary of changes, see: Salam 2019.

5 See, for example: *Al Jazeera* 2019; Jeffrey 2019.

6 ICG 2019, 2020a, 2020c.

7 For example: On 12 November 2018, it was reported that in the three previous months 1,560 pistols had been seized (*Ezega* 2018b); however media reporting suggests only a fraction made the news. Similarly, in June, 2020, Addis Ababa Police reported that in the eleven months up to that point 19,235 guns had been captured (NBE 2020), only a fraction of which were reported in the media.

8 *Ezega* 2018b.

9 *Africa News* 2018.

10 *Borkena* 2018.

11 *Ezega* 2018a.

12 *Borkena* 2019b.

- 13 *Borkena* 2019c. NBE 2019c.
- 14 For example: *Borkena* 2020a. An Amharic EBC documentary was made regarding the investigation (EBC 2020). NBE 2019d.
- 15 NBE 2019b.
- 16 *Xinhua* 2019; *Borkena* 2019d. *Borkena* 2019a. *Ezega* 2019.
- 17 *Xinhua* 2019.
- 18 *Borkena* 2019e.
- 19 NBE 2019a; ESAT 2018; *Borkena* 2020b, 2020c; *AllAfrica*, 2018.
- 20 *Ezega* 2018b; *Reuters*, 2020.
- 21 ENA 2020.
- 22 *Ezega* 2018b; *Borkena* 2019c.
- 23 *Ezega* 2018b.
- 24 Cochrane and Kefale 2019.
- 25 Interview, rural farmer in Amhara region, January 2020. Notably, this interview took place before the violence that took place in June and July of 2020 where this vulnerability became even more apparent.
- 26 See, for example, the essays on <https://welkait.com/>
- 27 ICG 2020b.
- 28 Cochrane and Mandefro 2019.
- 29 See, for example: Birara 2020.
- 30 See, for example: Tamiru 2018.
- 31 Amhara Association of America 2020; SATENAW, 2019; Gedamu 2018; Alemayehu and Abegaz 2018. See also, for example: US Embassy in Ethiopia 2019; Birara 2020.
- 32 Interview, rural farmer in Amhara region, January 2020.
- 33 Interview, rural farmer in Amhara region, January 2020.
- 34 Interview, Woreda Security Officer, January 2020.
- 35 Interview, Woreda Security Officer, January 2020.
- 36 Interview, rural farmer in Amhara region, January 2020.
- 37 Interview, rural farmer in Amhara region, January 2020.
- 38 Interview, rural farmer in Amhara region, January 2020.
- 39 Mekonnen 1969.
- 40 See, for example: Zelalem 2020.