Jul
09

Letting them Die – Why Programs Fail

  • "In the old South Africa we killed people. Now we're just letting them die." – Pieter-Dirk Uys

In her 2003 book, 'Letting them Die': Why HIV/AIDS Prevention Programmes Fail, Catherine Campbell describes how "the best-intentioned programmes, even when they achieve high levels of mobilization of the least-powerful sectors of small local communities, may have less than optimal results." (p. 19). Because the project took place in the late 90s and the book was published in 2003, I will not focus on some of the time-specific issues raised by the author, rather upon the broader issues that continue to inform programming, and analysis of it.

What is quite unique about this book is its openness to explore failure, and its explicit exploration of failures from the perspective of a critical insider (as opposed to a critical outsider who may not have all the details or be aware of the historical nuances). For example: "The second shortcoming in project design that emerges was the way in which the project planners were over-optimistic and somewhat simplistic in assuming that diverse stakeholders would be equally committed to participating in partnerships in the interests of supporting the Project's proposed activities. It was also over-optimistic in assuming that the more powerful groupings would be motivated to collaborate in projects designed to promote the interests of marginalized constituencies with little social power or influence" (p. 60). And, "rather than working together to develop new frameworks of understanding and action, they simply continued to implement the approaches they had used before the Project… with little attempt to bring these activities into the Project's integrative framework, or to develop new forms of collaboration with new and non-traditional partners" (p. 152). "Somewhat ironically, despite its well-intentioned conceptual origins, in practice the 'stakeholder' concept is often used in a way that masks how these unequal power relations between stakeholders have the power to undermine community development goals" (p. 181). Although the activities analyzed are time, place and sector bound, the approach to understanding failure offers insight into how programming can learn from what did not work well. An example of what tends to be missed by critical outsiders is that of staff related challenges and conflict, which in this project played a crucial role in creating barriers for collaboration (see pages 160-162).

Readers will appreciate the dynamic conversation woven throughout this book that explores institutional factors affecting the community that are beyond it, while engaging in very localized activities. Poverty, migrant labor systems, all-male hostels, and the selective neglect of laws (e.g. on pages 64 and 105), are a few of the contextual factors Campbell is cognizant of, while making a case for the importance of localized activities that did not address these factors directly.

Reading parts of Campbell's book I had to remind myself that it was written about a project that took place in the late 90s, not 2016. For example, she writes "Clearly, such outcome measures are vital for measuring whether or not interventions have had their desired effects. However, they often contribute little to understandings of the processes whereby programmes do or do not succeed in having an impact" (p. 9). Which is a point I've made in a recent article looking at the Safety Net program in Ethiopia. Campbell concludes: "The history of the late twentieth century is replete with examples of failed but well-meaning attempts by countries in the North to 'help' countries in the South (it is not for nothing that Africa is sometimes referred to as the 'graveyard of development projects'). Yet, these same mistakes are made again and again" (p. 193).

On social capital and participation:

  • "Concern has been expressed that concepts such as social capital and participation are dangerously ambiguous. On the one hand, they serve as potential tools for critical social theorists who argue that it is only through grassroots participation in strong community-based organizations that socially excluded people will gain the power to lobby governments and other powerful bodies to recognize and meet their needs. On the other hand, such concepts have the potential to be 'hijacked' by neo-liberal, free-market theorists, who argue that grassroots organizations and networks have the power to take over many functions (e.g. welfare) previously assigned to governments or international development agencies. Such arrangements can serve as justifications for cuts in welfare spending in the more affluent countries of the North, and reduced development aid to poorer countries in the South. In order to avoid this perversion of the radical potential of the concept of social capital, it is vitally important that critical social scientists locate conceptualizations of social capital, participation and community development against the backdrop of wider conceptualizations of politics and power." (p. 52-53)
  • "…evidence suggests that not all forms of local participation have equally positive benefits for participants. Furthermore, there is much evidence that social capital is often unequally distributed in particular contexts. Thus, for example, research has shown that effective participation in local networks is most likely to take place among the wealthiest and the most educated members of a community. Furthermore, social capital may often serve as a source of social exclusion and disadvantage, in contexts where opportunities for creating, sustaining and accessing beneficial social capital are constrained by poverty, or other forms of social inequality, such as caste or gender." (p. 53)
  • "…in setting up projects of this nature, much more work need to be done in clarifying the boundaries and constituencies of different stakeholder groups. There must be clarity around exactly which people and which interests are represented by each stakeholder group. It is also vitally important for each stakeholder group to provide clear and transparent procedures for ensuring that appropriately representative figures are nominated to act or speak on its behalf. It is also important for particular stakeholder groups to establish transparent mechanisms whereby their representatives are seen to consult and report back to their constituencies, and to be fully accountable to the people they represent." (p. 180)
  • "The research also suggested that grassroots participation is by no means a 'magic bullet'. The potential for local participation to have positive health benefits depends very heavily on the extent to which local attempts by marginalized groups are supported and enabled by efforts of more powerful constituencies, at the regional, national and international levels, and the development of health systems and organizational infrastructure to co-ordinate joint efforts. Participation has the potential to create networks of bonding social capital within marginalized communities, which is a very important component of the possibility of change. Yet such change cannot happen with the parallel efforts of more powerful groups." (p. 196)
  1116 Hits
May
07

Descent into Chaos - Afghanistan

Reflections on international development from Ahmed Rashid's award-winning 2008 book "Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia." For those interested in the region, or of military intervention in the era of the 'war on terror' this is essential reading.

Proposals before 9/11:

  • "We proposed using economic aid related to the reconstruction of Afghanistan as a tool to isolate the Taliban and create an alternative political infrastructure that could also become a lobby for peace inside the country. Similar thoughts were being advocated by other U.S. and European officials." (p. 55)

Priorities and consequences:

  • "President Bush's embrace of Musharraf and the military, rather than of the Pakistani people and the development of state institutions and a democratic process, has created an immense hatred for the U.S. Army and America, hatred that penetrates all classes of society. Ninety percent of the $10 billion in aid that the United States has provided Pakistan with since 9/11 has gone to the military rather than to development." (p. xxxix)
  • "Richard Clarke attended meetings on Iraq on September 12. He later wrote, "At first I was incredulous that we were talking about something other than getting al Qaeda. Then I realized with almost a sharp physical pain that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try and take advantage of this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq." I visited Washington several times in early 2002, sincerely believing that now the United States would do the right thing by Afghanistan and rebuild the country. I came up with suggestions for the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development as to how they could speed up nation building. By the early summer of 2002, when it became clear that the United States had no intentions of rebuilding Afghanistan, disillusionment set in as I saw that Iraq was the real target." (p. 64)

On aid in Afghanistan:

  • "…in many areas, USAID humanitarian food deliveries and development projects were being taken over by the joint CAI-SOF teams. Credible Afghan tribal leaders who had been identified by the Afghan government or the UN as "positive agents of change," capable of fostering stability at the community level, were bypassed in favor of the commanders and warlords preferred by the CIA. Afghan civil society was being strangled even as it emerged, and the Afghan government was made to look incompetent and powerless. Afghan policy was now in the hands of covert CIA-SOF operatives, who had vast sums at their disposal but no mandate to rebuild the country." (p. 136)
  • "Several USAID officials were to resign disillusioned with their organization, disgusted at U.S. policy, and frustrated at their failure to be effective. USAID was eventually to get swept into the State Department and lose what little independence it once had. In keeping with prevailing views in the Republican Party, USAID became a source of funds for Christian fundamentalist NGOs active in the Muslim world – giving them $57 million between 2001 and 2005 out of a total of $390 million distributed to all NGOs." (p. 176)

Failure:

  • "U.S. consultancies and construction firms, rather than local NGOs, won the contracts to implement projects. Louis Berger alone won contracts to build ninety-six new clinics and schools in time for the Afghan elections, but a year later, at the end of 2005, only nine clinics and two schools had been completed. Designs for school buildings drawn up in California did not take into account excessive snowfall in Afghanistan, which buckled roofs. Some roofs were designed with so much steel that they could be put in place only with cranes, which were unavailable. A report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office published in 2005 stated that the projects were having little impact on reconstructing the country." (p. 190-191).
  • "Farmers were paid cash for eradicating their crop [opium] at the rate of $1,250 to $1,500 per hectare. MI6 and British commandos handed over cash to governors and police chiefs in the provinces to pay off the farmers. The program, which cost more than $80 million, was mired in massive corruption, as Afghan officials distributed the money to their tribes or clans, who took the cash but failed to eradicate the crop. Other farmers used the money to increase cultivation, while thousands of other who did eradicate their crop received nothing. A huge piece of the money ended up in the war chests of the warlords." (p. 321)
  1585 Hits
Subscribe to receive new blog posts via email