Over the last year I have posted about a number of books related to civil resistance. In reading that literature, one of the works that gets frequently referred to is "Why Civil Resistance Works – The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict" by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). Given that the field of study is a relatively niche one, the book is quite widely referenced (approaching 1,000 citations at the time of this posting). I had encountered presentations by Chenoweth as well as summaries of, and references to, this book elsewhere before reading it. The book is worth reading, as it provides a much more nuanced description of the methods and findings than what is presented elsewhere (even, I feel, by the authors). The simplified take away message has been: nonviolence is more successful than violence.

The book sets out to analyze civil action, largely comparing non-violence and violent campaigns. The authors "ask why nonviolent resistance has succeeded in some cases where violent resistance had failed in the same states, like the violent and nonviolent pro-independence campaigns in East Timor and regime-change campaigns in the Philippines. We can further ask why nonviolent resistance in some states fails during one period (such as the 1950s Defiance Campaign by antiapartheid activists in South Africa) and then succeeds decades later (such as the antiapartheid struggle in the early 1990s)" (p. 5). However, in this opening description, we start to encounter some of the challenges with quantitative assessments of complex movements. The authors have classified anti-apartheid activism in the 1990s as nonviolent. Reality was far more complex, while there were nonviolent tactics there was also violence as well as parallel violent movements. Attributing 'success' to the nonviolent components seems disingenuous. The authors say that if there was a 'significant amount of violence' (p. 13) it was not considered non-violent. However, this blurs the lines between nonviolence (in principle) versus movements who actively threaten violence (and may strategically use it in minor, demonstrative ways), both of which might be classified as nonviolent as the violence was not significant. What has not made it in the take away messages was this: "Characterizing a campaign as violent or nonviolent simplifies a complex constellation of resistance methods" (p. 12). This is important – and one of the nuances found in the book, but lost elsewhere. On methods, the identification of cases to include was not systematic (i.e. country by country), meaning that many are excluded. The authors reviewed the literature to find the cases, but many movements have not entered the academic literature. Other assessments might be complicated by the timeframe they are viewed in. For example, in the mid-2000s the violent Taliban movement might have rightly been classified as a 'failure' but that is far less clear on a longer timeframe.

Challenges aside, this is an interesting book. Beyond correlations, the authors explore processes, which I found quite insightful. For example, they write "large-scale and diverse participation may afford a resistance campaign a strategic advantage, which, in turn, increases the pressure points and enhances the leverage that the resistance achieves vis-à-vis its state adversary. The ability of nonviolent campaigns to more easily exploit these advantages of broad-based mobilization, and the high costs of prolonged disobedience and noncooperation has been so much more effective than violent resistance" (p. 41). Later, they write that the "results suggest that when regimes crack down violently, reliance on a nonviolent strategy increases the probability of campaign success by about 22 percent. Among the campaigns we explore here, backfiring may be an important mechanism through which nonviolent campaigns achieve success" (p. 51).

On long-term pathways, the authors find: "Insurgents, deposed elites, and emerging elites may perceive that violence is an effective means of expressing political preferences and gaining political power. For the losers in the conflict, who see the conflict in zero-sum terms, violence is therefore likely to remain the tactical method of choice. In other words, the constant threat of violence from all sides of the previous conflict exacerbates uncertainty rather than reducing it, thereby undermining Bernhard and Karakoc's essential element of democracy. Under such conditions, reaching mutually agreeable power-sharing arrangements and building democratic institutions are highly problematic." (p. 212)

Over the last decade there have been quite a number of books published on non-violence action (under a wide range of terminologies: people power, poor people's movements, civil resistance, collective action, etc). A good number of these works start out with the premise that non-violence is the best / only way for political change to occur, and go about crafting arguments rooted largely in that value-based position. I would also suggest that some of these books have misrepresented successful mass movements as being a non-violent movement, to further an argument, when in fact the reality is far more complicated. Although it book me too long to get around to reading it, I was pleasantly surprised with "Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present" (2009), edited by Roberts and Ash. The book is a collection of case studies and is a valuable addition for anyone interested in learning about the diversity of experiences, tactics and outcomes of citizen action. Many of the chapters are not biased by a value-driven objective to advocate for non-violence, many engage with the violent - or threat of violent - action that were present within and alongside other non-violent movements. The book is a dense 400+ pages of cases and can be summarized, but I highlight a few points that stood out for me (particularly in relation to the existing works on the topic):

• "A seemingly general commitment to the avoidance of violence is almost always in fact selective. The history of non-violent action is full of instances of very careful discrimination in judging the phenomenon that has been the subject of so much sweeping generalization - violence. Both Gandhi and Martin Luther King recognized some modest legitimate role for force." (p. 13)

• "South African mass resistance in the 1980s was far from strictly non-violent. Suspected African collaborators were killed, demonstrators often threw stones, and erected barricades, and in 1985 militant youths battled with some success to create no-go areas in the townships. Moreover, divisions between the ANC and the Zulu Inkatha movement resulted in serious inter-communal violence. Nevertheless, the South African struggle did overall provide an 'A to Z' of non-violent tactics." (p. 36-37)

• "The historical evidence of India's experience of non-violent civil resistance under the over-arching leadership of Mahatma Gandhi raises crucial issues about this mode of conducting conflict. Perhaps above all it shows that this is a political strategy and technique which, for its outcomes, depends greatly on the historical specificities - the nature of the opponent, the characteristics and beliefs of those who seek to use it, their relations with their clientele and with a wider domestic and international audience, and the encompassing ideological and political environment." (p. 56-57).

• "successful movements normally reflect a combination of favourable environmental changes and the creative efforts of activists to recognize, exploit, and indeed, expand the political opportunities afforded them by broader change processes" (p. 65)

• "The Iranian Revolution - like many others - 'came' from below rather than was 'made' from above. There were no statewide parties, no systematic networks, and no coordinated organizations mobilizing the mass protests, meetings, and strikes. On the contrary, the crowds were often assembled by ad hoc groups, grass-roots organizations, and, at most, informal networks: classmates in high schools, colleges, and seminaries; teenagers in the slums; guild members, shop assistants, and, occasionally, mosque preachers, in the city bazaars." (p. 177)

• "it is incorrect to undervalue the contribution of armed movements to Marco's downfall due to their end-game errors. If that radical pole had not existed Morcos might have been able to inflict greater physical harm on his more moderate political rivals. They may even have survived because Marcos turned his attention to the greater threat" (p. 192)

Highly recommended reading for anyone interested in the practice and experience of civil resistance. The is the most comprehensive set of cases I am aware of, and one of the more nuanced books addressing the relationship between violence and non-violence within these movements.

In 2016, ICNC offers a new, expanded stipend opportunity for both Ph.D. students and Junior Faculty. ICNC's Doctoral and Junior Faculty Research Fellowship enables eligible applicants to carry out research on civil resistance and/or conduct a study that can benefit from a civil resistance perspective, as part of their dissertation or for an upcoming book, journal article or book chapter.

For 2016, $20,000 in total has been allotted for this program. Each Fellowship award ranges between $2,000 and $10,000. The deadline to apply is May 30, 2016.

In addition to a stipend, Doctoral and Junior Faculty Research Fellowship includes several hours of scholarly mentorship provided by one of ICNC's academic advisors. Mentorship is set up when ICNC matches an awardee with an academic advisor interested in the awardee's research topic.

More here.