The Black Man's Burden

The role of institutions in development has becoming increasingly important, most notably in the recent works "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy" (2006) and "Why Nations Fail" (2012). Before these books, Basil Davidson wrote "The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State" (1992), which places a large emphasis on the role of institutions, their legacy, structure and formation. In is also a work that he writes offers the "conclusions of a lifetime" of experiences and study. Davidson writes "in this book I present in summary and perspective whatever wisdom I have gathered in these forty-odd years of African study" (p. 8).

The following offers some quotes that summarize his key arguments, but this is essential reading in full:

"Africa's crisis of society derives from many upsets and conflicts, but the root of the problem is different from these: different and more difficult to analyze. The more one ponders this matter the more clearly is it seen to arise from the social and political institutions within which decolonized Africans have lived and tried to survive. Primary, this is a crisis of institutions. Which institutions? To this the answer is easier. We have to be concerned here with the nationalism which produced the nation-states of newly independent Africa after the colonial period: with the nationalism that became nation-statism. This nation-statism looked like liberation, and really began as one. But it did not continue as a liberation. In practice, it was not a restoration of Africa to Africa's own history, but the onset of a new period of indirect subjection to the history of Europe. The fifty or so state of the colonial partition, each formed and governed as though their peoples possessed no history of their own, became fifty or so nation-states formed and governed on European models" (p. 10).

"The contrast with Japan after 1867 could really not be more accurate. Japan was able to accept "Westernization" on its own terms, at its own speed, and with its own reservations, ensuring as far as possible that new technology and organization were assimilated by Japanese thinkers and teachers without dishonor to ancestral shrines and gods. Japanese self-confidence would be salvaged. Such an outcome was impossible in dispossessed Africa. In retrospect, the whole great European project in Africa, stretching over more than a hundred years, can only seem a vast obstacle thrust across every reasonable avenue of African progress" (p. 42). In essence, the post-colonial efforts, by in large Davidson argues, faced and embraced an environment wherein the 'traditional' was ignored, considered backward and stagnant.

"At the outset of independence there had been a narrow gap in trust and confidence between the bulk of the population and the beneficiaries or leaders of anticolonial nationalism. The social aspects of the anticolonial struggle still retained primacy of influence over all those aspects concerned with nation-statist self-identification… Now, after ten or twenty years the gap has widened to an abyss: on one side, a great mass of resentful and impoverished rural people and, one the other, a small minority with quantities of wealth. Into that abyss there had plunged, more or less helplessly, the legitimacy and credit of the state which had allowed this gap to yawn." (p. 214-215). 

The ‘Nelson Mandela’ You Have Probably Not Heard About

​Robert Sobukwe (1924-1978). Leader of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in South Africa, a focal leader in the struggle against apartheid, Sobukwe was so feared by the apartheid government that after he led a mass non-violence protests to break unjust laws, he was jailed indefinitely for fear of what he might do. A law was created, called the 'Sobukwe clause' (as it was created for him, and only used against him), that would allow for his imprisonment not for what he has done (that time had been served), but what he was capable to do.

"How Can Man Die Better" (original 1990) by Benjamin Pogrund is one of the few books available on Robert Sobukwe, but one wishes more was available. As much as readers may come to appreciate the author, this book is probably better described as two biographies (one of Robert Sobukwe and one of Benjamin Pogrund, the author), and in that regard the book is somewhat disappointing. Nonetheless, given the lack of detailed resources on Robert Sobukwe, this book is well worth reading.

Robert Sobukwe was a force in his opposition to unjust laws. He stated that we "have been accused of bloodthirstiness because we preach 'non-collaboration'. I wish to state here tonight that that is the only course open to us. History has taught us that a group in power has never voluntarily relinquished its position. It has always been forced to do so" (p. 37). Yet, in his forcing of change, he was a staunch advocate of non-violence means.

"I know, of course, that because I express these sentiments I will be accused of indecency and will be branded an agitator. That was the reaction to my speech last year. People do not like to see the even tenor of their lives disturbed. They do not like to be made to feel guilty. They do not like to be told that what they have always believed was right is wrong. And above all they resent encroachment on what they regard as their special province. But I make no apologies. It is meet that we speak truth before we die." (p. 35)

The original arrest of Sobukwe was in relation to a mass movement he led to break the unjust 'pass laws' requiring people of color to carry passes everywhere they went, and face arrest if in the wrong place, or at the wrong time. "Sobukwe began to plan the campaign: workers were to be urged to leave their passes at home and report to the nearest police station on their way to work. They would, he anticipated, be arrested and prosecuted for not carrying a pass; this would have the twin effect of putting pressure on the government through clogging police stations, courts and jails, and on employers to intervene because they would be without labour" (p. 111).

Alternatively, and contrary to the popular narrative outside South Africa, "Mandela acknowledged that he had planned sabotage [i.e. adopted violent means]. He had decided it was unrealistic for black leaders to keep up the African National Congress' traditional policy of non-violence when the government frequently used violence to crush opposition, he told the court. 'Africans had either to accept inferiority or fight against it by violence. We chose the latter'" Mandela stated (p. 212).

Robert Sobukwe was released after years of imprisonment, and after six extensions of the 'Sobukwe clause' to imprison him for what he might do, rather than anything he had done. His physical health was in poor condition (he would later die of lung cancer), and his mental health challenged, after years of severe solitary confinement. Once released, he was severely monitored and restricted, effectively under permanent house arrest until his death.

Revolution and Authoritarianism in North Africa

The Arab Spring caught everyone by surprise, but was quickly explained as an expected, inevitable event. How can these largely contradictory narratives be brought together? This is part of the task undertaken in "Revolution and Authoritarianism in North Africa" (2017) by Frederic Volpi. The author writes that the "book strives to retain the implications of meaning-making in the construction of the causality and understandings of the 2011 Arab uprisings in North Africa. The argument is not merely that the idiosyncrasies introduced by multiple actors undermined the structural unfolding of revolution and transition in the region, but also that the protest episodes themselves were crucial elements in the formation of new political identities and processes. The task therefore is to generate better linkages between actor-based processes and the institutional-based dynamics of regime change and political reform… rather than compare and contrast the situations of those Arab countries that experienced regime change in 2011, I map the processes of change and of resilience that followed protest episodes in two countries that witnessed dramatic political transformation (Tunisia, Libya) and in two countries that experienced only mild institutional reform (Algeria, Morocco)" (p. 4-5).

The author takes a unique approach by combining theories – avoiding both the imposition of logic post-protest, and focusing solely on actors or institutions, but rather the unique and complex interactions between multiple factors. "The analysis I propose presents the dynamics of the Arab uprisings in terms of evolving interactions between actors in particular arenas of contestations" (p. 17). However, such individuals are not pre-determined to do anything: "people do not actually 'know' if or when they would engage in anti-regime protests until the protest was upon them. In this perspective, protest 'thresholds' cannot be estimated in advance because they are not only based on pre-existing preferences, but on new preferences generated as the protests unfold and as people reinterpret what is happening around them and to them" (p. 23).

Change is far more complex and unpredictable: "Had the provincial governor been aware of the risk of local riots in the central provinces being a catalyst for a national revolt, he might have dealt with the initial unrest in Sidi Bouzid differently. The inability to understand the transformative potential of such protest events is not simply a failure to predict accurately what might happen. It also reflects a particular mastery of techniques of authoritarian governance which are known to be effective, but to that moment. From a regime's perspective, cognitive failure is therefore not simply a lack of anticipation; it is also the result of having too much experience of a particular kind" (p. 76).

Volpi offers detailed insight into the North African uprisings, challenging many of the common assumptions about the Arab Spring, as well as social movements and how change happens. The book is an excellent resource, but would be challenging reading for undergraduate students – the readership of this book is likely academics and graduate students.

Interesting side note:

"The economic liberalism promoted by organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which were called upon by regimes to help resolve their financial difficulties, directly contributed to the rolling back of the welfare state in the region. The privatization of social services led to the growth of of the welfare provision of Islamist organizations, which stepped in to replace state provisions" (p. 46).

Stranglehold on Africa

​In 1962 Rene Dumont wrote False Start in Africa, which offered unique perspectives for the time period, many of which continue to be relevant. I picked up "Stranglehold on Africa" by Rene Dumont and Marie-France Mottin (1983) hoping to find an equally interesting ideas. I did not find it as good as the earlier work. It is highly critical, but has far fewer positive examples (or reasonable recommendations), as the earlier work offered. One can sense Dumont's frustration.

The book would be a welcome source of quotes for those in opposition of international assistance: "It is development that has brought about the worst destruction in the history of the world, on an even more lunatic scale than during the two world wars" (p. xi); "Those who agree to wear the golden chains of aid are soon locked into a vicious circle of increasing dependence" (p. 20); "the looters in the West aren't going to give up without a fight – too many interests are at stake, and the economic machinery has been running smoothly for too long. They scarcely give a thought to the long term and to the future of our planet" (p. 248).

Further: "we urge our readers to remember that we, the developed nations, form the bulk of the privileged beings busily exploiting the planet. The prime responsibility for world famine therefore rests with us. We are the real hypocrites" (p. xii); "We must never forget the genocide perpetrated against the people of Africa, millions of whom were transported as slaves to the plantations of North America; or the wars of conquest that disseminated the slave economy and the system of trading valuable raw materials in exchange for the rejects of our own industrial production; or the colonial economies which were run solely in the interests of the parent state" (p. 1); "the European countries would like to present a picture of themselves as generous, and sympathetic to the interests of the nations they have exploited for so long and on such a large scale, and whom they are now starving. They hope in this way to wipe out the very memory of the original sins of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution, of slavery and colonization, but in fact they are merely repeating them" (p. 7).

The book is also self-critical: "Rereading the book in 1980 I realized that the historical and, more important, the sociological data on which it was based were inadequate. It gives off a strong whiff of Eurocentrism in its approach to the realities of life in Africa" (p. 2). Yet, it still offers critiques of all fields for a myriad of countries, and heavily remains a book about what "we" ought to be doing for "them".

Dumont offers some interesting comments about China, and its comparisons: "In China the peasants would have taken the initiative and dug the channels themselves, but then China, which receives no aid in the way of foodstuffs, relies first and foremost on its own resources" (p. 167). "Tanzania's peasant population haven't inherited the tradition of hard work familiar to their counterparts in China. Circumstances have never forced them into working hard, with the exception of the immigrant workers on the sisal plantations" (p. 168).

Making Sense of the Syrian Tragedy

Few can tell the story of the Syrian revolution better than Yassin Al-Haj Saleh, who has been engaged in political activism in Syria for decades (spending sixteen years in jail for that, and now living in exile). "The Impossible Revolution: Making Sense of the Syrian Revolution" (2017) is Yassin's first book in English, but he is a prolific writer in Arabic, penning hundreds of articles since the onset of the revolution.

The book is a compilation of ten of Yassin's articles, which provides a unique look at the changing circumstances and ideas over the years (2011 to 2015). However, it also has downsides. As these articles were not written as book chapters, there is repetition and the book does not have the connected nature that a purpose written book typically does. For clarity, this is not the book that tells the Syrian story from beginning to present, rather the author writes that "this book does not tell the story of the Syrian revolution: it is rather an attempt to trace and chronicle some of its paths" (p. 24). In many ways, the essays describe failing systems: the failing revolution, the failing state, the failing international community (e.g. p. 19 on the US and Russia).

For this post, I share some quotes that relate to the mass uprising of people:

  • "As the survival instinct kicks in, the more abstract demands for democracy and self-determination will be seen as unnecessary luxuries. And while the revolution identified itself with goals that were civic-minded and public in spirit during its early stages, today these are barely discernible within what has become an extremely desperate struggle against a brutal power" (p. 65-66)
  • "I believe that the role delineated for the military component helped the peaceful revolution. Contrary to widespread belief, those who took up arms did not replace the peaceful revolution but rather contributed to its expansion and resilience. An approach limited to peaceful protesting would have weakened the revolution in confrontations with the regime, whatever the unquestionable moral superiority of a purely peaceful protest" (p. 87)​
  • "A powerful, unscrupulous offender, against whom a weak defender will not embrace high-minded principles that compromise the capacity for self-defence – under such conditions, conscience is a luxury, and so are culture and politics. It is a fateful situation, predisposed toward destruction" (p. 73)​
  • "We are locked in a vicious cycle. The long-standing violence of the regime provokes strong emotions among the abused, causing them to act violently and unjustly when they have the opportunity, while society seems to be continually surprised by what is happening and unable to either to organize itself against violations at the hands of the new aggressors or to influence their behaviour" (p. 183). 

From Bullets to the Ballot Box

Kinfe Abraham (1950-2007) was one of Ethiopia's leading academics, although his books are not well known outside of the country. In this post I pull some though provoking quotes and ideas from his 1994 publication "Ethiopia from Bullets to the Ballot Box: The Bumpy Road to Democracy and the Political Economy of Transition". The book remains timely because history provides us a wealth of lessons. At the time of writing, Kinfe was optimistic following the early years of a new government (1991-1994), when many new ideas and policies were being discussed. He writes, the changes "revived the hope and optimism of thee late 1960s and early 1970s which seems to promise that the "ballot box" and not the "bullet" might be the final arbiter which determines the new direction of political and economic life in Ethiopia" (p. xvi). At times, one forgets this book was written in the early 1990s.

"For the majority of Ethiopians, especially the small and large nations which had historically been denied legitimate recognition as nations, regional division and ethnic representation is one way of epitomizing their new achievement. Indeed, it is seen as a psychological and political break through by many. This new card enables them to negotiate for a better deal for their people and regions. However, in practical terms, ethnic and geographical division also have their associated drawbacks. There is a good deal of ethnic and geographical overlapping among the nationalities which might give vent to latent hostilities… Despite these problems, the present formula of ethnic federalism represents the first serious attempt by a government in power to address the complex problem of nationalities squarely and realistically" (p. 28-29). He later re-emphasizes this point: "Essentially, the debate underway in Ethiopia is about power and how it should be shared among the various regions whose nationalities currently make up the country. But there is also the complex task of creating an administrative structure geographically symmetrical to the ethic and linguistic configuration of the country. This task is by no means easy because geographical and ethic and linguistic divisions do not always coincide" (p. 49).

On resettlement:

"Resettlement was and will in the future remain an important issue to take into account. In fact with a bit of incentive it might even prove an attractive proposition for many. However, what the new government should be warned against is that such programs should not be undertaken without proper planning or through coercion. Instead, it should be planned, publicized and offered strictly to those who want it" (p. 99).

A worrisome historical trend:

"Although the Derg had pledged to hand over power to the people after a period of time, it failed to respect that pledge and moved on to create the structure which would consolidate its position of power… The state, in a bid to consolidate its power, resorted to intimidation, arrests and the physical elimination of people suspected of opposition" (p. 105).

Dessalegn Rahmato on de Soto (Property Law)

A previous post covered the main arguments of Dessalegn Rahmato's "The Peasant and the State: Studies in Agrarian Change in Ethiopia, 1950s-2000s" (2008), this highlights some interesting critiques ofDe Soto's influential book and argument:

"To begin with, by over-emphasizing the determinant role of property law and its legalization de Soto adopts a state-centric view of property rights and its guarantee for the poor. But, as we shall see later, formalization of the law by itself provides no robust guarantee, and where such guarantee has been achieved it has been the result of struggles of the poor themselves and non-state agents. Moreover, formal property law, he argues, and the conversion process in the law allows the poor to convert the assets into capital. Under capitalism, he states, the legal infrastructure is hidden in the property system, and the formal property system converts assets into value (pp. 45-46). But de Soto fails to recognize that the formal property system of capitalist societies is a product of a long historical process and the outcome of competing (often warring) economic interests, social classes, political parties or section groupings. Hidden in the formal property law of a capitalist country is a small slice of its social history. Where this kind of pluralist struggle is absent or weakly manifested, as is the case in many developing countries, property law comes to reflect the interests of one dominate group, or, as in Ethiopia, that of the state and its mandarins. Here property law is not inclusive but restrictive, prohibiting disadvantaged populations the freedom and opportunity to get the full value of their assets." (p. 187)

Dessalegn continues for another two pages, on the arguments made by de Soto, for those interested.

The Peasant and the State

Dessalegn Rahmato is one of Ethiopian social scientists, his ideas and publications have shifted public perceptions on issues of land and the rural smallholder farmers. This posts draws upon his work, "The Peasant and the State: Studies in Agrarian Change in Ethiopia, 1950s-2000s" (2008), which is essential reading for anyone interesting in rural Ethiopia.

As a book that covers five decades, Dessalegn begins by setting the stage for how the change of governments was experienced by the rural farming majority: "Over this half century much has changed in the country but much also remains the same. Similarly, while the three political regimes differ radically in a number of significant respects, they also have many things in common, particularly in their relations to the peasantry, their quest for a strong presence in the countryside, and, in some respects, in their approach to development management" (p. 13). What is the same? "An enduring element of state peasant relations is the paternalist attitude towards peasants held by local officials and party activists. Indeed, paternalism permeates all levels of state officialdom, including authorities at the top, and this is reflected in some of the main rural policies of the government. The underlying assumption is that the peasantry needs strong leadership to guide it to the greater good of modernization, as well as to protect it from outsiders with evil intentions, or the foolishness of peasants themselves" (p. 261).

Regarding the shifts: "On the one hand, agrarian change has removed some of the forces of peasant domination, but on the other hand, it has enhanced the power of the state over the peasant and inhibited the agency of the rural producers" (p. 23). On the Derg, the land reform "abolished landlordism, and this, in my view, is its enduring legacy and its greatest achievement" (p. 139). On the current government and land certification: "peasant insecurity is more deep-rooted and cannot be removed merely by issuing user certificates. Peasants are dependant on local officials for interpreting the law and interpretation is frequently made to suit the given circumstances. This is one of the factors for peasant subordination, and insecurity cannot be cured without addressing the causes of subordination" (p. 205). Further, he adds the land certification is viewed by some as a success as is used low cost and local administration, but "this is a misunderstanding of the whole point of the program: title registration is meant to provide security and to minimize disputes, and this can only be possible if the program is credible in the eyes of the beneficiaries concerned" (p. 210, also see p. 240).

His focal argument in the book is that "the role played by the human agent and the institutional environment impacting on human agency is either ignored or given insufficient attention… the question of human agency, that is the agency of the men and women who are responsible for cultivating the land and managing the resources associated with it, and the institutions that have helped or hindered them in their endeavour, must be placed at the centre of the agrarian debate. My concept of the term human agency here is similar to Sen's idea of capability. By agency I mean the ability to make independent decisions and free choices to bring about a desired outcome, and to secure the benefits free of imposition or coercion. It means the ability to have a voice, and to be an active force even if in a small way… a major determining factor is the nature of the rules of governance, particularly rights, freedoms and obligations embodied either in social values and norms or formal political institutions" (p. 21). He concludes the book in arguing that "human agency is an indispensable factor in accelerating change and invigorating the economy. As we have seen already, the agrarian systems we have dealt with stifled, in one way or another, the agency of the rural producer with dire consequences of which some have been discussed at length in the preceding pages. A fundamental rethink of this issue, which I believe is overdue, will have wider implications in terms of political institutions, power relations, attitudinal and management approaches" (p. 350).

Dessalegn argues that "Famine is a measure of the vulnerability of the peasant world as well as of its resilience, a reflection of the nature of class relations as well as of the relations between the state and peasantry. Famines do not occur if [the] peasant economy is robust, if the popular classes in the rural areas have a tradition of social assertiveness and resistance, or if the state is in some manner accountable to the people" (p. 43). And, that "Ethiopian peasants have not enjoyed this kind of freedom [to choose one's leaders, to justice, to freedom of speech], and I believe this has been responsible to a large extent for the failure of agrarian progress in this country" (p. 22). He later concludes: "Rural poverty cannot be solved through the instrumentality of the state alone, but requires the active engagement of the poor themselves. Democratizations, property rights that are inclusive of the poor, enabling citizens' groups, including poor people's organizations: these, individually or in ensemble, help to expand human agency, the agency of the poor in particular" (p. 276-277)

Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia

Bahru Zewde has written an excellent book on the history of the student movement in Ethiopia, this book goes back further, to the late 1800s and early 1900s, exploring the activities and impact of the intellectuals of that time period. The book, "Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century" (2002) by Bahru Zewde, is very well researched and is an excellent addition for anyone seeking to understand the historical roots of the modern Ethiopian state.

Bahru argues that "the Ethiopian educated elite have played a preponderant role in the political history of the country, a role clearly incommensurate with their number. It is thus difficult to understand the genesis and course of the 1974 revolution without a proper appraisal of the Ethiopian student movement, which could said to have started to follow a revolutionary course in the mid-1960s. In a number of ways, notably in the articulation and resolution of what has been characterized as 'the national question', the legacy of that movement is still with us. And yet the intellectual protagonists of the second half of the twentieth century had their predecessors in the first half. The revolutionary option was preceded by the reformist one" (p. xi). The means through which the educated elite engaged with each other and exerted influence was primary through newspaper articles (p. 188).

The book presents detailed histories of the individuals, I draw from the chapter that attempts to present commonalities, and readers with interest in specifics can turn to the text. Bahru writes that "there is no doubt that the intellectuals' interest in provincial and municipal administration and in fiscal centralization were secondary to their overriding concern for social justice, and particularly for the alleviation of the condition of the peasantry" (p. 120). But this is not an idealized call, for example, the "enormity of the institution of slavery and the slave trade was such that few of the educated elite could fail to be moved into strong denunciation of them. When it came to the less brazen form of oppression and exploitation of the southern peoples, however, many failed to overcome the dominant cultural milieu in which they had grown up" (p. 130).

One challenge faced by all contemporary governments in Ethiopia – including a pressing issue of the day – is that of how the nations within a nation come together. For many of the educate elite of the early 1990s, assimilation was the answer: "Coming to the practical ways by which the policy of assimilation could be implemented, Tedla points to education and the army as the two most important vehicles of assimilation. Tedla goes back to classical Rome to demonstrate how the army has always been a factor for assimilation, be it through the intermarriage of garrison troops with local women or the recruitment of subject peoples into the imperial army. Likewise, all other facets of government policy – administration, justice, economic organization – should be regulated by the policy of assimilation. Provincial boundaries need to be redrawn to facilitate the policy. Oromo numerical predominance in the southern provinces should be tempered by a policy of Amhara settlement" (p. 132-133). I will refrain from commentary, and leave this historical point of reference for discussion elsewhere.

A letter of 1887 advising governor Ras Alula, from an immigrant (Petros Giyorgis, or 'Petros the Ethiopian'), warns (in Amharic): "You may not have read history. But the faranj [i.e. European] are like an earworm. Earworm is the smallest of worms. But it will eat up and destroy the largest of trees. Likewise, the faranj first come in the name of trade; gradually, they end up taking over the country. So, hit them now, wipe them out, or else your country is lost… You can move a sapling with your toe; but once it is grown, it will require many axes and saws" (p. 18). Notably, in 1896 the Ethiopian army defeated the nearly 20,000-troop Italian army, attempting at colonizing the country. On this, Bahru argues that "Adwa set the modality for Ethiopia's modern relationship with Europe in particular and the West in general. Ethiopia joined the ranks of the handful of African and Asian countries which remained politically independent but were under the shadow of the overwhelming European presence that had engulfed the two continents" (p. 208-209).

Bahru concludes: "what a long way things appear to have come from the time in the early twentieth century, when intellectuals relied on gentle persuasion rather than violent confrontation, when they sought royal patronage rather than the overthrow of the monarchy, when they advocated gradual reform rather than the revolutionary transformation of society" (p. 211).

Peasant Households and their Resource Base

​A previous post highlighted a publication from Ethiopia, which tend to be lesser known (and harder to find). This post highlights an old publication, similarly challenging to locate copies of, but may prove quite useful for those looking for historical data points for comparability: "Competition and Co-operation: North Ethiopian Peasant Households and their Resource Base" (1993) by Harald Aspen. The publication is more of a long manuscript than a book, and the author states that "by publishing the present work it is made available both to my colleagues in the PPDR programme, and to anyone else who may have some interest of the subjects treated here. Basically, this paper is a data report, but efforts have been made to comment and to suggest interpretations and means of analysis which can not necessarily always be directly read out of the empirical data presented" (p. 3).

Throughout, the book presents a variety of data sets on different aspects of smallholder lives and livelihoods. Since data is sparse for past periods, I found works such as these quite useful to explore what has changed, and also what has not. In this case, the data comes from the end of the Derg period. I highlight notes from Aspen's text, on marriage and debt:

"There are various means of getting a spouse, varying from contractual agreements involving a marriage feast and a written contract to elopement or (for males) abduction and 'raping' (t'alafa, probably most often with the consent of the prospective girl, i.e. a form of elopement). Between these extremes are cohabitation (sometimes as a preliminary to a formal marriage) as well as the occasional practice of 'hiring wives' for a limited period, where the 'wife' gets an annual amount of clothes and/or money from her 'husband' in return for sexual and domestic services. In the latter case the payment may be viewed as a compensation for the woman's renouncing of other assets belonging to the man in case of his death or if he decide to cancel the relationship. It is also not unusual for women not to remember much of their first encounter with a husband; several female informants have told that their first marriage was very short-lived: as young girls their parents had arranged their marriage and they took the first opportunity to escape from their husband, sometimes after a couple of probably unpleasant days" (p. 20)

"Key informants in Ganat reported that prior to the revolution, loans were accessible from professional moneylenders who usually charged an interest rate of 10% per month. After the revolution, credit in the form of cash has been less available, but whenever loans are given, they are interest free. The 1989 survey contained a small section on currently unsettled personal debt, and of the 210 household heads, only 29 (13.8%) reported to be indebted, of whom one was a woman. At the time of the survey, the tax obligations, when all 'special contributions' were included, were felt to be a heavy burden by most PA [Peasant Associations, now Kelebes] members in Ganat" (p. 81). Research in southern Ethiopia presented a much different picture on debt, as of 2015.

Powered by EasyBlog for Joomla!